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Abstract 
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Title:  Human Factors Contributing to Unstabilized Approaches and Landings in 
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Year: 2018 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the human factors reported as contributing to 
operational incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings in United States-based commercial 
aviation. While previous aviation safety studies have analyzed aviation incident data when 
investigating the human factor influences during commercial aviation operations and incidents, 
unstabilized approaches and landings have not been explicitly examined using similar methods. 
Informed by the findings and recommendations of the Flight Safety Foundation’s Approach and 
Landing Accident Reduction Task Force, this study examined and analyzed the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) incident report data from unstabilized approach and landing events. 
The study used a nonexperimental, single-group, quantitative ex post facto design, and binomial 
logistic regression analysis to test associations between the ASRS-coded human factors and 
reported unstabilized approach outcomes. Results revealed that there were statistically significant 
differences in the outcome of unstabilized approaches (χ2(1) = 6.579, p = .01, w = .26), with less than 
37% of the reported unstabilized approaches being responded to with go-around compliance. 
However, results from the binomial logistic regression did not reveal significant associations of the 
ASRS-coded human factors with the likelihood of unstabilized approaches being continued to 
landing rather than go-around compliance. The continued investigation of human and non-human 
factors identified as contributing to reported incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings is 
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recommended. Results from such investigations have the potential of informing effective go-
around compliance training designs. 
 Keywords: aviation, Aviation Safety Reporting System, go-around, human factors, 
unstabilized approaches 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 United States-based commercial air carrier travel has remained the safest mode of 
transportation based on passenger fatality statistics between 2002 to present (Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, n.d.). With the exception of the events on September 11, 2001, when 
international terrorists intentionally crashed loaded U. S. commercial passenger aircraft, U. S. air 
carrier travel has statistically been the safest mode of public transportation in the 21st century. As 
the National Airspace System capacity continues to increase, the commitment to aviation safety 
has remained a priority for national air transportation (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 
2016). Moreover, the continued emphasis on aviation safety has shifted from primarily reactive 
safety assessments based on accident statistics to more proactive assessments of commercial 
aviation operations and training (see FAA, 2017a; Flight Safety Foundation [FSF], 2017). In 
March 2017, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) identified the frequency of commercial 
passenger flight crews flying unstabilized approaches and landings as a current threat to aviation 
safety (FSF, 2017). However, this was not the first time unstabilized approaches and landings 
had been noted as a persistent concern for National Airspace System commercial aviation in the 
21st century. 
In 2015, strengthening procedural compliance, particularly compliance with flying 
stabilized approaches and adhering to go-around policies, was identified as a priority by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). As a result, strengthening procedural compliance 
as an aviation safety concern was listed on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List. The NTSB’s Most 
Wanted List represents the agency’s topmost recommendations of critical changes necessary for 
saving lives through the reduction of transportation accidents (NTSB, n.d.). Among its 
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recommendations, the NTSB called for improvements by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and air carriers in pilot training for procedures such as those for stabilized approaches. 
The troika of better procedures, training, and compliance was the agency’s mandate for ensuring 
a culture of safety in commercial aviation. 
Statement of the Problem 
Approximately 65 percent of commercial aviation accidents occur during the flight 
phases of approach and landing (FSF, 2017; International Air Transportation Association 
[IATA], 2016). According to the Flight Safety Foundation study, 83 percent of those approach 
and landing accidents were avoidable if flight crews had intervened on their unstabilized 
approaches and initiated a go-around. Thus, following proper operational procedures of initiating 
a go-around in response to an unstabilized approach could potentially avoid 54 percent of 
commercial aviation accidents. However, despite commercial aviation industry go-around 
policies, it is estimated that only approximately 3 percent of unstabilized approaches are met 
with go-around policy compliance (FSF, 2017).  
Questions arose during the FSF study as to why highly trained flight crews frequently 
ignored a go-around policy designed for safety. It was speculated that this noncompliance might 
be influenced by the inherent risks of losing control of the aircraft during a go-around (FSF, 
2017), such that there was a risk tradeoff. It was further speculated there was a flight crew 
heuristic that a go-around should only be initiated if its risks were judged as being less than the 
risks associated with an unstabilized approach and landing (FSF, 2017). Not an intentional 
component of formal training, this heuristic became the target of the FSF’s increased focus on 
aviation safety. 
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Following a multi-year study, FSF’s Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) 
Task Force provided summary findings of its extensive research in understanding go-around 
policy noncompliance (FSF, 2017). Among its list of findings, the Task Force identified several 
systemic issues such as a collective industry norm of accepting noncompliance of go-around 
policies and low management awareness of the impacts of go-around noncompliance on 
approach and landing accidents (ALA). In addition, the Task Force identified that flight crews 
lacked adequate awareness of ALA risks, effective go-around decision making was low, and 
procedures and training inadequately address the variable challenges of a go-around (FSF, 2017). 
The Task Force concluded that go-around policies and procedures were not sufficient for 
ensuring aviation safety during approaches and landings, and among the identified deficiencies 
was flight crew training for appropriate operational decision making during unstabilized 
approaches and landings.  
In its final report, the ALAR Task Force delivered a series of strategic recommendations 
that targeted organizational and system deficiencies and necessary improvements. These 
recommendations included ensuring operationally-meaningful policies, managing those policies 
effectively, and increasing situational awareness relevant to unstabilized approaches and 
landings (FSF, 2017). Additional recommendations included ensuring that flight crew training 
appropriately reflects different risk scenarios in which a go-around should be executed. The 
ALAR Task Force provided a poignant message that what has been lacking is an “understanding 
of the psychology of noncompliance” (FSF, 2017, p. 3) for go-arounds. Thus, among the final 
recommendations was understanding flight crews’ situational awareness levels and 
psychological profiles for managing internal go-around policies.   
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The ALAR Task Force also provided training-specific recommendations. A strategic 
priority was ensuring that go-around risk scenarios were incorporated into effective go-around 
training and awareness (FSF, 2017). In meeting this strategic priority, the ALAR Task Force 
provided 21 recommendations targeting improvements in training for go-around execution, 
including an emphasis on go-around training using a range of operational scenarios for realistic 
simulation of go-around conditions. This realism is expected to incorporate lessons learned 
through the review and analysis of operational events and incidents. Following the Task Force’s 
(2017) report, there have been no documented efforts reviewing and analyzing operational 
incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings in commercial aviation toward the outcome of 
improving effective commercial pilot training for go-around compliance and execution. 
Significance of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to use Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) data to 
investigate human factors reported as contributing to operational incidents of unstabilized 
approaches and landings in commercial aviation. While approach and landing safety has been the 
subject of multiple efforts and research by various organizations, such as the FAA and IATA, the 
recommendations offered by the ALAR Task Force provided a new focus on understanding the 
pervasive noncompliance with go-around policies. Previous studies have analyzed aviation 
incident data reported in the ASRS database when investigating human factor influences during 
commercial aviation operations and incidents (e.g., Barnes & Monan, 1990; Jentsch, Barnett, 
Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Sarter & Alexander; 2000; Sumwalt, Morrison, Watson, & Taube, 1997; 
Tiller & Bliss, 2017) , but not unstabilized approaches and landings. Likewise, understanding the 
attitudes and conditions of noncompliance with go-around policies begins with understanding the 
characteristics of unstabilized approach and landing incidents. By examining and analyzing data 
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reported in ASRS from unstabilized approaches and landings, this study sought to identify 
human factors associated with and contributing to reported incidents of unstabilized approaches 
and landings, and provide recommendations informing effective go-around training designs. 
Research Questions 
There were three research questions that guided the study: 
RQ1: What human factors are identified in the ASRS reports as contributing factors to 
aviation incidents of unstabilized approaches? 
RQ2: To what extent, if any, are the ASRS-coded human factors associated with 
unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database?   
RQ3: If associations between the ASRS-coded human factors and unstabilized 
approaches exist, what is the relationship of the human factors in the likelihood 
that the reported event was an unstabilized approach continued to landing versus 
go-around? 
Limitations and Delimitations 
 There were several barriers needing to be addressed in the course of this study. One such 
barrier to the study of human factors during aviation events of unstabilized approach and landing 
was that direct observation of flight crew operations during commercial aviation incidents of 
unstabilized approaches and landings was not feasible. Given increased security measures in 
commercial aviation, it was not possible to gain access to the commercial aircraft flight deck 
during actual operations in order to gather data through direct observational methods. However, 
this study was investigating the human factors identified and coded in the ASRS incident reports 
filed by the flight crew following events of unstabilized approaches. Therefore, direct 
observation was not necessary for the study. 
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Another issue relevant to this study was that at the time of the study there existed no 
consensus on stabilized approach criteria and go-around policies among the commercial aviation 
operators. Despite this variability, there did exist commonly referenced stabilized approach 
criteria recommended to the aviation industry and incorporated into standard operating 
procedures for go-around decision-making (FSF, 2000). These were the stabilized approach 
criteria used in this study, and the go-around policies themselves were outside the study scope.  
There also existed the barrier that the researcher in this study would not have access to all 
documents used by ASRS analysts in initial coding of the reported incident. ASRS analysts 
gather information from several other reporting organizations, such as the Aviation Safety 
Awareness Program, and these documents were not directly available to the researcher. 
However, this study was investigating the human factors coded by the ASRS analysts and the 
accompanying flight crew narratives, and this approach did not rely on access to those other 
information sources.  
There are inherent limitations associated with the ASRS database, and data coded from 
the reported incidents must be carefully interpreted. Incident reports filed with ASRS are 
voluntary and rely on self-reporting, and therefore vulnerable to voluntary reporting bias. Since 
reports are filed after the incident has occurred, there is also the risk of hindsight bias and self-
protective interpretation (Jentsch et al., 1999). Voluntary reporting data, such as the ASRS data 
used in this study, is subject to reporting bias not only in what is reported but also what is not 
reported. Despite this risk of reporting bias, studies have found similarities of voluntarily filed 
reports with other safety data and a significant correlation (r = .91) of voluntary reporting with 
mandatory incident reporting has been revealed (Chappell, 1997). Further, it can be assumed that 
consistently reported aspects identified in large numbers of reports are likely true, since a large 
  
7 
number of reporters are not likely to erroneously report in the same way (Chappell, 1997). 
Another limitation of using ASRS data is that the incident of interest may not be reported in 
matching terms of interest to analysts and researchers, which poses a challenge in coding the 
incidents and aggregating relevant data (Wickens & McCloy, 1993). Thus, all incident reports 
are subject to extensive analysis by the ASRS analyst team, comprised of highly trained pilots, 
air traffic controllers, mechanics, and members of management teams with substantial aviation 
and human factors experience (ASRS, 2016). Finally, ASRS reports are only those incidents that 
were reported, and not reflective of all such incidents and others that share similar operational 
characteristics. Any conclusions drawn from studying reported events can be generalized only to 
the reported incidents, and not to the full population of such events. However, if an attribute is 
reported, then it can be assumed that it is an attribute also existing in the larger population of 
such events (Chappell, 1997).  
Despite these limitations, there are inherent strengths in incident reporting that may 
benefit human factors research. Data from voluntary reporting has been shown to be similar to 
data from other safety reporting. The information contained in incident reports is from 
individuals directly involved in the incident, incident reports provide for larger samples than 
accident reports, and the reported incident can be considered ecologically valid (Chappell, 1997). 
Finally, it was assumed that given a large sample of voluntary reports, there exists a high 
probability that the reports contain information useful in the analysis of possible causes of the 
reported problems (Billings & Reynard, 1984). This latter point has been among the rationale of 
substantial research using ASRS data. 
There are also limitations inherent in researching archived data. ASRS data is not 
gathered with the intention of addressing a particular research question, which means that 
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information of other potential variables of interest or important third variables may not have been 
gathered (Cheng & Phillips, 2014). In addition, as noted earlier, ASRS data is not directly 
gathered from an individual, but rather it is self-reported. The individuals collecting archived 
data are not the individuals who are subsequently analyzing the data for research purposes 
(Cheng & Phillips, 2014). In the context of this study, the researcher analyzing the data entered 
by the ASRS analysts was not involved in the initial collection of the data being analyzed. In 
order to mitigate the risks of these limitations, this study followed similar practices as those 
practices detailed in earlier research using ASRS archived data. Given that the study used de-
identified publicly-available archived information, risks of the study were minimal and 
institutional review board (IRB) approval was not needed. 
There were delimitations in this study. Given that this study investigated human factors 
associated with United States-based commercial aviation incidents, accident reports filed with 
the NTSB were not included. This study used the incident report data contained in the ASRS 
database, which has long been identified as the single-most largest publicly available and 
searchable database of commercial aviation safety incident data (Chappell, 1997). It should not 
be assumed that the incident reports are any less meaningful than accident reports in 
investigating aviation safety. In a seven-year study of human factors in aviation incidents, 
Billings and Reynard (1984) found that the ASRS data suggests that “accidents involving human 
factors are, in fact, a subset of incidents involving those factors” (p. 963). Accidents originate 
from the same larger set of attributes as incidents. However, accident reports provide insight only 
into what happened, when it happened, and who was involved (Harle, 1997). It is aviation 
incident data that can inform of the how and why the events occurred (Chappell, 1997; Harle, 
1997). Therefore, since the scope of this study was investigating the human factors influencing 
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flight crew noncompliance of go-around policies during unstabilized approaches and landings 
reported to ASRS, the study data was limited to the aviation safety data contained in the ASRS 
database. 
The time frame for selection of United States-based commercial aviation incidents used 
in the study spanned five years from 2012 to 2016. It was anticipated that this time frame would 
provide an adequate sample of unstabilized approach and landing incidents, and there would 
have been limited changes to go-around policies during that span of time. This study was limited 
to commercial passenger air carriers operating under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121, 
consistent with the operations studied by the FSF’s ALAR Task Force (FSF, 2017). Since the 
study was investigating unstabilized approaches and landings, it used only incidents that 
occurred during the initial approach, final approach, and landing phases of flight. Furthermore, 
the study was investigating flight crew human factors during the incidents. This means that the 
study would be limited to incident reports that were filed by the flight crew involved in the 
incident. Although there are other individuals who may file a report, such as air traffic control 
operators, this study was investigating the human factors influencing flight crew noncompliance 
of go-around policies during unstabilized approaches and landings.  
Definition of Terms 
 Accident. In brief, “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which 
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such 
time as all such persons have disembarked, in which (a) a person is fatally or seriously injured…; 
(b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure…; or, (c) the aircraft is missing or is 
completely inaccessible” (ICAO, 2001, p. 1-1). 
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Approach. Phase of flight beginning when the “crew initiates changes in aircraft 
configuration and/or speeds enabling the aircraft to maneuver for the purpose of landing on a 
particular runway; it ends when the aircraft is in the landing configuration and the crew is 
dedicated to land on a specific runway. It may also end by the crew initiating an ‘Initial Climb’ 
or ‘Go-around’ phase” (IATA, 2016, p. 3). 
 Approach and landing accident. “Accidents occurring during a visual approach, during 
an instrument approach after passing the intermediate approach fix, or during the landing 
maneuver. This term also applies to accidents occurring when circling or when beginning a 
missed approach procedure” (FAA, 2008b, p. 1). 
 Communication breakdown. Human factor; human-to-human communication problems 
and issues, either spoken or visual signals, during human-to-human interactions (ASRS, 2017). 
 Confusion. Human factor; the loss of orientation of time, location, and personal identity, 
and may include the loss of memory in correct recall of previous events or new learning (ASRS, 
2017). 
 Distraction. Human factor; being distracted from an operational task (ASRS, 2017). 
 Fatigue. Human factor; diminished operational performance as a result of prior 
expenditure of work-related effort and energy (ASRS, 2017). 
Go-around. “Begins when the crew aborts the descent to the planned landing runway 
during the ‘Approach’ phase; it ends after speed and configuration are established at a defined 
maneuvering altitude” (IATA, 2016, p. 3). 
Human factor. Deficiency or breakdown in flight crew human performance (ASRS, 
2017). 
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Human-machine interface. Human factor; issues attributed to the interface between 
human and system, either hardware or software. Does not include problems associated with the 
interface between the human and the entire aircraft, and instead must be human and component 
(ASRS, 2017). 
Incident. “An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation” (ICAO, 2001, p. 1-1). 
Instrument meteorological conditions. Meteorological conditions that are less than the 
minima specified for visual meteorological conditions (ICAO, 2005). 
Landing. Phase of flight beginning when the “aircraft is in the landing configuration and 
the crew is dedicated to touch down on a specific runway; it ends when the speed permits the 
aircraft to be maneuvered by means of taxiing for the purpose of arriving at a parking area. It 
may also end by the crew initiating a ‘Go-around’ phase” (IATA, 2016, p. 3). 
Physiological. Human factor; physiological problems other than fatigue, such as illness, 
health or fitness issue, or stress (ASRS, 2017). 
Situational awareness. Human factor; issues associated with decreased awareness of 
what is happening in order to understand how actions, events, and information impact 
operational goals and objectives in the present and the near future (ASRS, 2017). 
Time pressure. Human factor; internally- or externally-imposed pressure related to time, 
such as the actual or perceived need to expedite operations (ASRS, 2017). 
Training/qualification. Human factor; issues or problems attributed to experience, 
qualifications, knowledge, and/or recency (ASRS, 2017). 
Troubleshooting. Human factor; issues or problems attributed with isolating a fault 
(ASRS, 2017). 
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 Undesired aircraft state. A safety-compromising aircraft state induced by the flight 
crew that is still recoverable (IATA, 2016).  
Unstabilized approach. “Failure to establish and maintain a constant attitude, airspeed, 
descent rate, on approach, or making aircraft configuration changes at or below 500 feet HAT 
(AGL) on approach when conducting a precision approach in VMC, or at or below 1,000 feet 
HAT on approach when conducting a precision approach in IMC. (Air carriers typically require a 
stabilized approach either by 500 or 1,000 feet HAT, depending on the carrier.) A non-precision 
approach may also be considered unstabilized if there is a significant variance from appropriate 
speed, rate of descent, attitude, or configuration profiles” (ASRS, 2017, p. 5). 
Visual meteorological conditions. Meteorological conditions of flight visibility, distance 
from clouds, and cloud ceiling that are not less than the established minima (ICAO, 2005). 
Workload. Human factor; issues or problems attributed to the ability to cope with or 
perform increased task demands (ASRS, 2017). 
List of Abbreviations 
ALA Approach and landing accident 
ALAR Approach and landing accident reduction 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
IATA International Air Transportation Association 
IMC Instrument meteorological conditions 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
VMC Visual meteorological conditions 
Summary 
Although U. S. commercial aviation has long been classified as the safest mode of 
passenger transportation, safety remains a primary focus in NextGen airspace developments. 
Unstabilized approaches and landings are persistent and pervasive risks to commercial aviation 
safety, and they have been identified as a top current safety threat. Echoing the earlier 
recommendations by the NTSB, the FSF ALAR Task Force called for increased efforts 
improving flight crew training in order to promote go-around compliance. The ALAR Task 
Force concluded that go-around policies and procedures have not been sufficient for ensuring 
aviation safety during approaches and landings (FSF, 2017). Deficiencies in flight crew training 
for the appropriate operational decision making during unstabilized approaches and landings 
were identified. According to the ALAR Task Force findings, improvements to flight crew 
training for go-around compliance need to be informed by the lessons learned from the review 
and analysis of operational events and incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings (FSF, 
2017). To date, there have been no documented efforts reviewing and analyzing operational 
incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings in commercial aviation toward the end of 
understanding the psychology of go-around noncompliance and improving effective commercial 
pilot training for go-around execution. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate human factors identified and coded as 
contributing to reported operational incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings in 
commercial aviation. Understanding the attitudes and conditions of flight crew noncompliance 
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with go-around policies and procedures begins with understanding characteristics of unstabilized 
approach and landing incidents. Thus, the aims of this study were three-fold: (1) identify the 
human factors that are coded in ASRS reports as contributing to aviation incidents of 
unstabilized approaches; (2) assess to what extent, if any, the ASRS-coded human factors are 
associated with unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database; and, (3) determine if 
there was a relationship of the human factors in the likelihood that the reported incident was an 
unstabilized approach continued to landing versus go-around. This study had the potential of 
identifying human factors associated with and contributing to reported incidents of flight crew 
go-around noncompliance during unstabilized approaches and landings, and informing effective 
go-around compliance training designs. 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Literature 
Approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) have been a persistent aviation safety concern. 
As early as the Wright brothers’ pioneering efforts of manned flight, controlled landing without 
crashing was a target end state of successful flight (Wright Brothers Aeroplane Company, n.d.). 
More than a century later, perturbations to the approach and landing phases of flight prevail. In 
an earlier study by the FSF ALAR Task Force, the average worldwide fatal ALA rate from 1980 
through 1996 was 16.8 per year (Joint Safety Analysis Team [JSAT], 1999). Between 2007 and 
2016, approximately 56% of all fatal accidents in worldwide commercial operations occurred 
during the approach and landing phases of flight (Boeing, 2017). Although substantially less than 
the fatal ALA rate of 23 per year predicted a decade earlier (JSAT, 1999), this was an average 
fatal ALA rate of 3.5 per year. However, these numbers do not account for the nonfatal ALA 
accidents and incidents resulting in aircraft damage and other adverse outcomes. While the 
average fatal ALA rate has been significantly reduced, the overall ALA risk has not. Although 
only as many as 4 percent of all approaches occur in conditions jeopardizing aviation safety, 
nearly 97 percent of those at-risk approaches are voluntarily continued to landing (FSF, 2017). 
According to these numbers, only 3 percent of at-risk approaches in commercial aviation are 
countered by adherence to the policies and procedures intended to mitigate them. While ALAs 
occur at a low frequency, the costs of them in terms of fatal outcomes are the highest in 
commercial aviation. 
Understanding the Approach Phase of Flight 
 Comprising only approximately 14% of total commercial in-flight time (Boeing, 2017), 
the approach phase of flight is characterized by some of the highest flight crew workload and 
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task saturation (FSF, 2017; Harris, 2011; Schvaneveldt, Beringer, & Lamonica, 2001). 
Beginning at the top of the descent phase of flight, pilots continuously manage the complex 
reduction of flight energy in speed, altitude, and distance in order to remain within a narrowing 
acceptable range for safe landing (IATA, 2016). Pilots are not only working to control the 
aircraft itself, but doing so among the variable environmental influences of weather and changing 
airspace around the arrival airport. The aim of the approach is to be in and maintain the proper 
configuration of the right speed and attitude for a safe landing and completion of the landing roll 
to taxing speed (IATA, 2016). This is the fundamental intention of a stabilized approach, and the 
flight crew must stay ahead of the aircraft in order to do.  
 Stabilized approaches. Despite variations across commercial aviation operators in how 
stabilized approaches are defined in the standard operating procedures (FSF, 2000), there exist 
certain criteria for stabilized approaches that are essentially the same throughout the industry 
(IATA, 2016). The most commonly referenced set of criteria for stabilized approaches can be 
found in the global FSF ALAR Task Force recommendations provided in the ALAR Briefing 
Notes (FSF, 2000). When on approach, the general requirement is that the flight be stabilized by 
1,000 feet above the airport elevation when operating in instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC) or stabilized by 500 feet above the airport elevation when operating in visual 
meteorological conditions (VMC) (FSF, 2000). An approach is stabilized when all of the 
following criteria are met (FSF, 2000). The aircraft must be on the correct flight path and the 
path can be maintained with only moderate heading and pitch adjustments being necessary. The 
aircraft descent sink rate must be no greater than 1,000 feet per minute. The power setting and 
the speed of the aircraft must be maintained at the manufacturer’s recommended setting and 
speed for landing configuration, with speed deviations being no more than 20 knots above. 
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Neither power setting nor speed may fall below the recommended setting or speed. Finally, the 
aircraft is in the correct landing configuration, and all approach briefings and checklists have 
been conducted. Specific types of approaches, such as instrument landing system approaches, 
sink rates necessary in excess of 1,000 feet per minute, and approaches in other abnormal 
conditions, all have additional criteria or require special approach briefings prior to commencing 
the approach (FSF, 2000).  
The criteria for stabilized approaches recommended by the FSF ALAR Task Force are 
consistent with those criteria identified by the FAA (2014) and IATA (2016). According to the 
FAA (2014), the aircraft must be in the proper landing configuration early in the approach with 
landing gear extended, flaps selected and trim set for landing, and fuel properly balanced. The 
aircraft must be properly configured for landing, on the correct lateral and vertical track, and at 
the proper speed for landing before descending through the 1,000-foot elevation point in IMC or 
500-foot elevation point in VMC (FAA, 2014). The descent rate and indicated airspeed must be 
maintained within specified limits, and speed should never be less than the manufacturer’s 
recommended speed for landing (FAA, 2014). The IATA (2016) maintains the same elevation 
stabilization criteria for both IMC and VMC, but also notes that these stabilization altitudes can 
range from 1,500 feet for IMC to 500 feet for VMC. The IATA criteria includes the approach 
speed being only slightly faster than the manufacturer recommended touchdown speed, descent 
rate commensurate with approach angle and speed, aircraft flap and gear configured for landing, 
aircraft attitude stable in all three axes, and engine thrust above idle and stable (2016). In sum, an 
aircraft is on a stabilized approach when the pilot establishes and maintains the aircraft in the 
proper configuration, proper speed, and proper path for landing at a predetermined point on the 
runway (FAA, n.d.).  
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Benefits of a stabilized approach. When the approach is stabilized, the flight crew is able 
to maintain awareness and close monitoring of the horizontal and vertical flight path, rate of 
descent, aircraft speed, and engine thrust (FSF, 2000). This increased overall situational 
awareness promotes improved inter- and intra-cockpit communications, crew resource 
management, decision-making, and judgement of the aircraft landing performance. Pilots are 
better able to anticipate factors that might risk stabilization, detect deviations in operational 
limits, take any necessary corrective action to maintain stabilization, and decide when, and if, an 
approach is no longer stabilized (FSF, 2000). In brief, a stabilized approach is the safest 
operational profile for the safest handling of the aircraft (FAA, 2014). When such flight 
conditions are not established and maintained during the approach, it is considered an 
unstabilized approach. 
Unstabilized approaches. Given that the challenges and emergent problems faced by a 
commercial flight crew vary from flight to flight, there is “no such thing as a typical airline 
flight” (Harris, 2011, p. 148). Challenges or problems emerging during the approach phase of 
flight may interfere with pilots establishing and maintaining the operational characteristics of a 
stabilized approach, and the approach may become unstabilized. Fundamentally, an unstabilized 
approach is an approach that does not meet or maintain the established criteria for a stable 
approach profile at or below the aforementioned elevation criteria for a stabilized approach 
(IATA, 2016; FSF, 2000). Transient deviations do not immediately qualify an approach as 
unstabilized, but instead the approach is unstabilized when deviations in the flight parameters 
cannot be promptly corrected with effective countermeasures (FSF, 2000). 
Factors influencing unstabilized approaches. Unstabilized approaches occur frequently 
under certain circumstances (Dismukes, 2010), and have been attributed to a number of factors, 
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which themselves are influenced by associated factors (FSF, 2000). The most common tactical 
error in U. S. commercial aviation accidents between 1978 and 2001 was the failure to 
appropriately counter an unstabilized approach (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). In a 
prominent study of 76 approach-and-landing accidents and serious incidents between 1984 and 
1997, the FSF ALAR Task Force (2000) identified several hazards increasing the risk of an 
accident or serious incident related to unstabilized approaches and landings. 
Approach hazards. The ALAR Task Force (2000) found that more than half of the 
reviewed accidents and incidents occurred under one or more of the following conditions:  
 Flying a non-precision instrument approach or visual approach; 
 In the absence of radar service; 
 At airports located in hilly or mountainous terrain; 
 During precipitation, either rain or snow; or, 
 In darkness or twilight. 
A third of the accidents and incidents analyzed by the ALAR Task Force occurred during 
approaches that experienced unidentified adverse wind conditions, such as low-altitude wind 
shear (FSF, 2000). Other influencing factors were the absence of safety equipment (e.g., ground-
proximity warning system), unexpected automation failure (e.g., autopilot failure to capture 
glideslope), and inadequate aids for safe approaches and landings (e.g., absence of 
approach/runway lights). In addition to the aforementioned approach hazards, which may be 
influenced by the actions or non-actions of the flight crew (FSF, 2000), there are factors 
influencing unstabilized approaches more directly attributed to actions and attitudes of the flight 
crew. These contributing factors fall under the category of human factors. 
  
20 
Human factors. In 87 percent of the accidents and incidents analyzed by the ALAR Task 
Force (2000), flight crew continuation of an unstabilized approach was the causal factor, and 
attributed to human factors. Nearly 25 percent of the accidents and incidents involved flight crew 
disorientation, including visual illusions. Fatigue and time pressure are associated with reduced 
attention and time allocated to planning, preparing, and conducting a safe approach. Reduced 
situational awareness, often attributed to an increased workload during atypical approaches, 
interferes with the proper management of flight path, rate of descent, and speed, which 
subsequently increases workload as pilots take countermeasures to mitigate the disruption to 
approach stability. Short-notice runway changes or other late communications from ATC may 
increase workload as the flight crew attempts to reconfigure the aircraft for the new approach, 
and pilots may be overly confident in being able to accommodate the new approach. Additional 
factors influencing unstabilized approaches include over-reliance of pilots on each other to assess 
excessiveness of deviations, over-confidence of flight crews in their ability to recover from 
unstabilized conditions, and biased belief that the aircraft can be stabilized (FSF, 2000).  
In short, an unstabilized approach is one in which the approach is not stabilized at the 
minimum stabilization altitude prescribed for the IMC or VMC operation of the approach, or the 
approach becomes unstabilized below that prescribed minimum stabilization altitude (FSF, 
2000). Whether the approach is not stabilized or becomes unstabilized due to human or other 
factors does not influence the appropriate actions that should be taken by the flight crew. In the 
event of an unstabilized approach, it is an industry standard that either flight crew member 
should call for a go-around (FSF, 2000; FSF, 2017). When a go-around is called by either flight 
crew member, it is an industry standard that a go-around be conducted. 
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Go-Around Policies and Procedures 
 It is a commercial aviation industry and FAA standard that standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for commercial flight deck crew members include go-around policies and procedures 
(FSF, 2000). These SOPs should include topics addressing the approach philosophy of go-
arounds, conditions in which a go-around should be called and conducted, and procedures for 
calling and conducting a go-around. The FAA recommendations for go-around policies and 
procedures previously included in the FAA Advisory Circular covering SOPs for flight deck 
crew members are now found in the Advisory Circular for mitigating the risks of a runway 
overrun upon landing (FAA, 2104; FAA, 2017b). The FAA recommendation to all commercial 
aviation operators is that company policies and SOPs emphasize that either flight crew member 
may call for a go-around (FAA, 2010; FAA, 2014). Furthermore, given the immediacy of the 
situation during an unstabilized approach, the FAA recommendation is that when a go-around is 
called by either flight crew member, the pilot flying must immediately respond to the go-around 
callout by executing a missed approach (FAA, 2010), also referred to as go-around procedure 
(FAA, 2014). The importance of being prepared for a go-around is increased in the low 
frequency of occurrence, and this preparation begins with the approach briefing (FSF, 2000). 
 Approach briefing. The approach briefing is intended to provide both flight crew 
members an opportunity to correct any erroneous assumptions and develop a shared mental 
model of the approach (FSF, 2000). Despite this enduring understanding across the industry, the 
ALAR Task Force found that nearly three-quarters of the accidents and incidents analyzed 
between 1984 and 1997 were attributed to an inappropriate or omitted approach briefing. A full 
approach briefing appropriately begins before the flight crew initiates descent, and it will 
generally include review and discussion of the following items: 
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 Aircraft and fuel status; 
 Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS); 
 Top-of-descent point; 
 Approach charts and airport charts; 
 Use of automation; 
 Landing and stopping configuration and expectations; 
 Intended deviations from SOPs; and, 
 Go-around and missed approach procedures (FSF, 2000). 
As part of the typical approach briefing, the flight crew reviews and discusses the go-around and 
missed approach procedures. These procedures typically include the necessary flight parameters 
for a safe approach and landing at the airport, appropriate altitude height for stabilization, 
specific go-around call to be verbalized if necessary, flight crew task sharing duties, and vertical 
and lateral navigation necessary for flying the published missed approach (FSF, 2000).  
 Missed approach. Flying a missed approach following a called go-around requires a 
compressed highly dynamic sequence of actions on the part of the flight crew (FSF, 2000). On 
the approach, the aircraft is configured for decreasing altitude, speed, and thrust; however, the 
configuration for flying a missed approach involves increasing altitude, speed, and thrust. In 
brief, the flight crew is resetting and maintaining the go-around target pitch-attitude, resetting 
and verifying the go-around thrust, and monitoring the aircraft performance. Effective and 
efficient task-sharing and crew resource management during the missed approach are of 
paramount importance. The pilot flying is selecting the takeoff/go-around mode, rotating the 
aircraft, following the pitch command, checking go-around power and aircraft performance, and 
being prepared to either counteract a nose-up pitch effect or trim the aircraft nose-down. The 
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pilot not flying is setting the appropriate flaps, retracting the landing gear, monitoring aircraft 
attitude, checking the flight-mode annunciator, and monitoring flight parameters ready to call 
any excessive deviations (FSF, 2000). The flight crew is trying to stay ahead of the aircraft. 
When a go-around is called below the approach minimum altitude, the challenges and risks 
associated with flying a missed approach increase (FSF, 2017), and this may contribute to flight 
crews continuing an unstabilized approach to landing. Although go-around policies and 
procedures for missed approaches are intended to mitigate the unnecessary safety risks of 
unstabilized approaches, the ALAR Task Force (2017) found in a follow-up study of approach-
and-landing accidents and serious incidents that pilot non-compliance with go-around policies 
continues to be a critical concern for commercial aviation safety. It was this 2017 report by the 
FSF ALAR Task Force that called for an increased effort on the part of the commercial aviation 
industry to counter the persistent trend of go-around policy non-compliance. 
The Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project 
 In 2008, the FSF ALAR Task Force initiated the Go-Around Decision-Making and 
Execution Project in response to the persistent serious concerns of go-around noncompliance 
during unstabilized approaches (FSF, 2017). The FSF earlier study of approach-and-landing 
accidents and serious incidents from 1984 through 1997 revealed what was later identified as not 
being an anomalous trend of go-around noncompliance. The failure to conduct a go-around was 
also subsequently identified as the paramount risk factor in ALAs and the leading causative 
factor in runway excursions from 1994 through 2010 (FSF, 2017). Given that these and other 
similar studies (e.g., FSF, 2009; JSAT, 1999; Joint Safety Implementation Team [JSIT], 2001) 
had thoroughly investigated ALAs and their contributing factors, an understanding of the 
psychology of go-around noncompliance was lacking (FSF, 2017). It was this understanding of 
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the psychology of go-around noncompliance that was the intention of the Go-Around Decision-
Making and Execution Project initiated as part of the FSF Go-Around Safety Initiative of 2011. 
To meet this goal, the FSF ALAR Task Force commissioned an independent group to investigate 
go-around decision-making of flight crews and management. 
 Flight crew decision-making. The psychology of flight crew go-around decision-making 
during unstabilized approaches was investigated (FSF, 2017). A survey was constructed to gather 
information from flight crew members related to psychological precursors of unstabilized 
approach risk assessment and go-around decision-making. A sample of 2,340 pilots were asked 
to recall unstabilized approach events they had experienced and provide detailed descriptions of 
the events including subjective aspects (e.g., their situational assessments) and psychological 
representations of objective characterizations of the aircraft and environment (e.g., flight 
instabilities). Pilots also reported job-related demographic information and their flight 
operational characteristics. Based on their responses, pilots were assigned to one of three groups, 
based on their experiences during unstabilized approach, for response analysis: pilots who only 
experienced landing during an unstabilized approach, pilots who only experienced a go-around 
following an unstabilized approach, and pilots who experienced both a landing and go-around 
during an unstabilized approach. The set of psychological and psychosocial factors that were 
assessed were suggested as facets of a comprehensive and holistic concept of situational 
awareness, and included the pilot’s: 
 Affective awareness (gut feeling for threats); 
 Anticipatory awareness (seeing and/or monitoring real and potential threats); 
 Critical awareness (drawing on experience to assess emergent events); 
 Task-empirical awareness (knowing the operational envelope of equipment); 
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 Functional awareness (knowing how to read/translate information from instruments); 
 Compensatory awareness (knowing how and when to compensate/adjust for present and 
anticipated operational conditions for safe and compliant operations); 
 Hierarchical awareness (knowing operational procedures, order, and sequencing); 
 Relational awareness (assessing and engaging crew member relationships for safe and 
compliant operations); and, 
 Environmental awareness (how company support and safety practices influence 
commitment to safe and compliant behavior) (FSF, 2017). 
It was hypothesized that higher scores on these factors would be associated with better 
assessments of unstabilized approach risks and operationally-compliant go-around decision-
making.  
 The study also gathered data for assessing the environmental and physical parameters that 
influence how pilots perceive the risks of unstabilized approaches, and how these perceptions 
influence the judgments of when to go-around (FSF, 2017). Pilots were presented with 
hypothetical flight scenario narratives that included five distinct flight parameters, and asked to 
report the degree of deviation in those scenario-specific parameters that would result in them 
calling a go-around. The intention of this part of the study was to infer at what point in the 
approach different risk factors become both salient and important to the pilots.  
 Management decision-making. The psychology of company management decision-
making about how the company responds to go-around noncompliance was investigated and 
analyzed (FSF, 2017). A second survey was constructed to gather information from company 
management of their perceptions, beliefs, and experiences regarding unstabilized approaches and 
how responses to noncompliance are managed by the company. Managers were asked about rates 
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of go-around policy compliance in their company and also the commercial airline industry. In 
addition, information was gathered as to the managers’ level of satisfaction with their company’s 
go-around compliance, appropriateness and effectiveness of their company’s go-around policies, 
level of company-wide support for policing compliance, and their overall assessment of the 
urgency in addressing the risks of go-around noncompliance. As in the flight crew study, a 
similar set of psychological and psychosocial factors suggested as facets of a comprehensive and 
holistic concept of situational awareness were assessed. However, instead of the focus being on 
the flight approach itself, the focus for the management study was on the level of situational 
awareness related to the influence of unstabilized approach and go-around policies on company-
wide operations. [Note: Given that the aim of this current study was investigating the human 
factors of flight crew operations during unstabilized approaches, the results of the management 
study were beyond the scope of the current study. Therefore, it was not included. For more 
information, see the Final Report to Flight Safety Foundation (FSF, 2017).] 
 The psychology of non-compliance. Results from the flight crew study revealed that 
unstabilized approach pilots (i.e., pilots who had landed during unstabilized approaches) 
evaluated substantially lower (p < .05) across all nine situational awareness factors than go-
around pilots (i.e., pilots who had conducted a go-around) (FSF, 2017). The conclusion was that 
a pilot’s ability to correctly perceive and assess risk during unstabilized approaches was directly 
affected by the pilot’s situational awareness competencies. There were no differences (p > .05) 
between unstabilized approach pilots and go-around pilots in terms of identifying fatigue, 
confidence in abilities, willingness to challenge crew or authority, and pressure to land. 
However, the unstabilized approach pilots reported significantly lower scores (p < .05) than go-
around pilots in their proper fatigue management, gut feelings of risk to stabilized approaches, 
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ability to anticipate the need for and influence the decision for a go-around, assessment of risk in 
approach instability, and agreement in and intolerance of deviance from company go-around 
policies. The conclusion was that unstabilized approach pilots experienced greater perceived 
pressure to land, lack of crew support for a go-around, discomfort in being challenged or 
challenging others, and inhibitions about calling for a go-around due to a perceived authority 
imbalance in the flight deck. Notably, the results indicated that, in hindsight, unstabilized 
approach pilots report internal regret for their decision to land during an unstabilized approach. 
In comparison to go-around pilots, unstabilized approach pilots had lower ratings of their flight 
outcomes and beliefs that they had made the correct decision, and higher ratings of beliefs that 
they should have made a different decision and they had needlessly endangered the flight. These 
results appear to convey a conflicting message: unstabilized approach pilots regret their go-
around noncompliance, but simultaneously disagree with their company’s go-around polices. 
The ALAR Task Force concluded that there existed a “normalization of deviance” (p. 17) and it 
poses unnecessary risk to the aviation safety culture (FSF, 2017). 
 There were also notable findings in the obtained data regarding pilot perceptions of go-
around thresholds (FSF, 2017). As a whole, pilots perceived the thresholds for calling for a go-
around were lower than the published thresholds, and the perceived threshold varied as a 
function of the aircraft elevation and instability parameter the pilot was considering as primary 
reason to call for a go-around. Examples of instability parameters include, but are not limited to, 
anticipating braking action, sink rate deviation, or aircraft configuration. When considered in 
conjunction with situational awareness factors, lower situational awareness leads to lowered 
sensitivity to relevant cues that influence a pilot’s correct assessment of the objective risks 
inherent in the approach. In this context, lower situational awareness is measured as lower 
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sensitivities to the psychological and psychosocial factors conducive to go-around compliance. 
The result is a mental model of the perceived risks that does not accurately represent the 
objective levels of the actual risks, and this produces an “over-occurrence of noncompliant [go-
around] decision-making” (FSF, 2017, p. 19). 
 Key ALAR recommendations. There were a number of recommendations provided by 
the ALAR Task Force in response to the findings of the study. Among these recommendations 
were corrective actions that should be taken to mitigate go-around policy noncompliance, 
including ensuring that policies make sense operationally, policies are managed effectively, and 
awareness of the risks associated with go-around noncompliance increased (FSF, 2017). In order 
to take these and other corrective actions necessary for improved go-around compliance, the 
ALAR Task Force provided several recommendations specific to flight crew training. The 
overarching recommendation was that flight crew training needed to enhance psychosocial 
awareness and management, and how both psychosocial awareness and management contribute 
to go-around noncompliance (FSF, 2017). Recommendations specific to flight crew training 
included, but were not limited to: 
 Go-around training should appropriately reflect diverse go-around execution risk 
scenarios, both typical and atypical; 
 Go-around training should include a range of operational scenarios, both typical and 
atypical, and these scenarios should involve realistic simulation; and, 
 Go-around training should incorporate lessons learned from operational events/incidents 
(FSF, 2017). 
In sum, flight crew go-around training must train pilots to exercise tactical judgment and 
procedural compliance for unhindered appropriate go-around decision-making (FSF, 2017). In 
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order to improve go-around compliance, the recommendation was to vary some initiations of the 
go-around scenario at different points in the approach when crews appear not ready for them 
(Rosenkrans, 2015). The speculation is that exposing flight crews to more unexpected 
circumstances when a go-around is the appropriate response may influence their readiness and 
willingness to comply with go-around policies. Research has revealed a similar speculation that 
training improvements will benefit flight crew performance in unexpected unstabilized approach 
conditions. In a study investigating the effectiveness of airline pilot training for atypical events, 
Casner, Geven, and Williams (2013) found that when pilots encountered unexpected events, 
including an unstabilized approach condition of low-level wind shear, there were notable 
decrements in performance. Based on their findings, Casner et al. (2013) suggested that flight 
crew training should include additional training for unexpected events. In the context of the 
ALAR Task Force conclusions, training in a wide range of atypical operational conditions may 
facilitate increased awareness of the risks inherent in those conditions. 
The ALAR Task Force recommendation for improved training for go-around policy 
compliance is consistent with the FAA recommendations (see FAA, 2008b), which refer to the 
FSF ALAR’s earlier briefs (see FSF, 2000). The FAA encouraged that flight crews and training 
managers be familiar with the recommendations for reducing ALAs in order to promote a pro-
active orientation to go-around compliance (FAA, 2008a; 2008b). According to the ALAR Task 
Force, realistic training scenarios are needed for validation of recommended strategies for 
improved go-around compliance training, and this training should be informed by the lessons 
learned from actual commercial aviation operations. 
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Toward Operationally-Informed Go-Around Training Designs 
 Training is considered one of the controllable variables in commercial aviation safety 
(Bent & Chan, 2010). In order to inform go-around training designs with lessons learned from 
operational events and incidents, approach-and-landing incidents must be thoroughly analyzed in 
the context of this particular goal. The archival resource with the most abundance of aviation 
incident reports readily available for such analyses is the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) database.  
The ASRS database. ASRS manages a database of voluntarily submitted aviation 
incident reports toward the end of identifying system deficiencies and operational safety issues 
threatening aviation safety and providing data for improvements in aviation safety (Aviation 
Safety Reporting System [ASRS], 2016). Since its inception in April 1976 and through 
December 2016, ASRS had received nearly 1.5 million incident reports (ASRS, 2016), with each 
report containing detailed information of the aviation safety incident. Given the breadth of data 
gathered by the ASRS, the database has been a model for domains other than aviation seeking to 
develop their own database of safety-related incidents (Killen & Beyea, 2003). In addition, 
aviation incident data such as that of ASRS has been suggested as beneficial to informing how 
and why the adverse aviation incidents occurred (Chappell, 1997; Harle, 1997). 
Aviation studies using ASRS data. The ASRS database has been the source of data used 
in a number of aviation studies. The predictive factors in aviation accidents and incidents have 
been investigated using ASRS data (e.g., Baker, 2001; Walton & Politano, 2010), but it is the 
contributing human factors in aviation incidents that are more commonly investigated using 
ASRS data. Barnes and Monan (1990) used ASRS data in their study of cockpit distractions, and 
they found that more than one-third of the incidents related to distractions were associated with 
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matters not central to safe flight operations. In an examination of flight crew performance during 
ASRS incidents involving aircraft malfunctions, Sumwalt and Watson (1995) found significant 
differences in how flight crews respond to malfunctions as a function of perceived severity. 
Inadequate flight crew monitoring was investigated by Sumwalt, Morrison, Watson, and Taube 
(1997) using ASRS reports and the researchers were able to draw conclusions as to the nature of 
the monitoring inadequacies and the factors that contribute to them. In their investigation of 
situational awareness-related incidents, Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, and Salas (1999) used ASRS 
data to assess if the loss of flight crew situational awareness was related to the role of the pilot, 
and the results indicated that it was associated with flight crew role. Sarter and Alexander (2000) 
analyzed ASRS incident reports in their investigation of the types of pilot error (e.g., commission 
or omission) and the underlying cognitive stage during which the error occurred. The study is an 
exemplar of using ASRS incident data to understand the how and why of the incident. Aviation 
decision-making issues and outcomes were investigated by Mosier et al. (2012) using ASRS 
data, and the researchers found that there were descriptively distinct interrelationships between 
specific antecedents and human errors in the events that were insightful as to the issues and 
challenges in commercial aviation operations. In a study investigating flight crew-ATC 
communication conflicts reported in the ASRS database, Mosier et al. (2013) identified types of 
conflicts, operational contexts and operator states during the conflicts, and conditions under 
which conflicts potentially increase. Ross and Tomko (2016) used ASRS data in their analysis of 
reported incidents in which flight crew states of confusion were identified as contributing to the 
adverse event, and they found that the patterns of pilot confusion could be classified in 
operationally-specific contexts. The aforementioned studies are representative of the broad use of 
ASRS data for commercial aviation research. However, missing from the growing body of 
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literature are studies of the viability in using ASRS incident report data for a better 
understanding of unstabilized approaches, and subsequently informing operationally-relevant go-
around training scenarios. 
Operationally-informed scenarios from ASRS data. ASRS incident reports have been 
suggested as a logical source of operationally-informed scenarios that can be included in the 
flight crew training curriculum (Mangold, Morrison, & Frank, 1995). Although this 
recommendation was provided more than 20 years ago, there have been no documented 
investigations of the ASRS data as a source of operationally-informed scenarios for go-around 
compliance training. Thus, it was the purpose of this current study to investigate human factors 
reported in ASRS incident reports as contributing to operational incidents of unstabilized 
approaches and landings in commercial aviation. The ALAR Task Force recommended 
understanding the pervasive noncompliance with go-around policies as pivotal in effective go-
around compliance training. Understanding the attitudes and conditions of noncompliance with 
go-around policies begins with understanding the characteristics of unstabilized approach and 
landing incidents.  
Summary  
 At the onset of the descent phase of flight, commercial flight crews aim to continuously 
manage the aircraft configuration of speed and attitude for a stabilized approach to a safe 
landing. Although occupying less than 14 percent of total commercial flight time, more than half 
of all fatal accidents in worldwide commercial aviation operations occur during the approach and 
landing phases of flight (Boeing, 2017). Unstabilized approaches are the primary risk factor in 
ALAs, and nearly 97 percent of unstabilized approaches are voluntarily continued to landing 
(FSF, 2017) in conditions that unnecessarily jeopardize commercial aviation safety. In other 
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words, flight crew continuation of an unstabilized approach was the causal factor, and 
attributable to human factors. Despite go-around policies and procedural training designed to 
mitigate needless risks to aviation safety, the tendency for highly trained flight crews to continue 
with an unstabilized approach persists. 
In response to the pervasiveness of go-around noncompliance, the FSF ALAR Task 
Force conducted an extensive study of the psychology of go-around noncompliance as part of the 
FSF Go-Around Safety Initiative of 2011 (FSF, 2017). The results of the study revealed that 
there were differences between commercial pilots who had continued an unstabilized approach to 
landing and commercial pilots who executed a go-around in response to an unstabilized 
approach. It was found that a pilot’s ability to correctly perceive and assess risk during 
unstabilized approaches was directly affected by the pilot’s situational awareness competencies 
(FSF, 2017). Pilots who executed a go-around scored higher across all nine factors of situational 
awareness compared to pilots who landed during unstabilized approaches. As for human factors 
associated with go-around noncompliance, there were also differences (FSF, 2017). Compared to 
pilots who executed a go-around, it was revealed that pilots who landed during unstabilized 
approaches experienced greater influence of human factors associated with a perceived pressure 
to land, lack of crew support for a go-around, discomfort in being challenged or challenging 
others, and inhibitions about calling for a go-around due to a perceived authority imbalance in 
the flight deck (FSF, 2017). Further, the ALAR Task Force interpreted from the results a 
concerning risk to the commercial aviation culture. Commercial pilots who do not comply with 
go-around policies and procedures appear to have normalized an attitude of go-around 
noncompliance (FSF, 2017).  
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The ALAR Task Force recommendations included the need to understand the psychology 
of go-around noncompliance, and the lessons learned need to be applied to commercial pilot 
training programs. Go-around training needs to incorporate lessons learned from operational 
incidents in order to appropriately reflect typical and atypical go-around execution risk scenarios, 
and training scenarios should involve realistic simulation (FSF, 2017). The assumption is that 
training in a wide range of typical and atypical operational conditions may facilitate increased 
awareness of the risks inherent in those conditions that pose risk to stabilized approaches and 
warrant execution of a go-around. According to the ALAR Task Force, realistic training 
scenarios are needed for validation of recommended strategies for improved go-around 
compliance training (FSF, 2017). In sum, understanding the attitudes and conditions of 
noncompliance with go-around policies begins with understanding the characteristics of 
unstabilized approach and landing incidents. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
This study critically examined and analyzed ASRS incident report data to investigate the 
associations of flight crew human factors with reported incidents of unstabilized approaches and 
landings. The study assumed that the data contained in the ASRS incident reports could be 
exploited for the benefit of increased operational-fidelity in commercial pilot operations training 
for go-around decision making and improved national commercial aviation safety. 
Research Approach 
The study was a continuation, and extension, of earlier analyses of ASRS data to answer 
questions and test hypotheses informed by previous studies (see Ross & Tomko, 2016; 2017) and 
relevant research of safety issues in commercial aviation operations using incident report data. 
This study used a nonexperimental, single-group, quantitative ex post facto design. A 
nonexperimental approach was most appropriate since the independent variables were not 
manipulated during analysis of the ASRS incident reports. Non-randomized sample data was 
compiled into a single group for qualitative and quantitative analyses. Since the analyses was of 
archived, coded data from ASRS reports, an ex post facto approach was used for the archival 
research in the study. Observational and survey methods were not appropriate for this study, as it 
was outside the scope of the study to observe live commercial pilot operations. Methods similar 
to those of this study have previously been employed in researching the contributing and 
predictive factors of aviation accidents (e.g., Baker, 2001; Shappell et al., 2007), aviation 
incidents (e.g., Barnes & Monan, 1990; Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Walton & 
Politano, 2010), and joint analyses of accidents and incidents (e.g., Mosier et al., 2012), as well 
as evaluating safety taxonomies (e.g., Tiller & Bliss, 2017). 
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Study Procedures 
Given the categorical and nominal nature of the ASRS data, primarily nonparametric 
statistical methods were employed. The statistical procedure for this study was binomial logistic 
regression. Using binomial logistic regression, associations between each nominal independent 
variable and the nominal dependent variable can be assessed while taking into account all other 
independent variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Given 
the intention of this study was to identify the nominally-coded factors (independent variables) 
that may be associated with nominally-coded adverse aviation events (dependent variable), 
binomial logistic regression was more appropriate than chi-square contingency tables or log-
linear analyses, which are used solely to test associations and relationships between variables 
(Agresti, 2013).  
A Priori Power Analysis. An a priori power analysis was computed using G*Power 3 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Chen, Cohen, and Chen (2010) proposed odds ratio 
thresholds that could be interpreted consistent with the long-standing Cohen’s d. Chen et al. 
(2010) determined that odds ratios < 1.5 and odds ratios > 5.0 were equivalent to Cohen’s d < 0.2 
and Cohen’s d > 0.8. This interpretation of odds ratios has been used across domains (see 
Ashford, Lanehart, Kersaint, Lee, & Kromrey, 2016; Cheung et al., 2017; Matejkowski & 
Ostermann, 2015; Peterson, 2017). Based on early considerations of the literature during the 
development of this current study, it was determined that the a priori power analysis for the 
binomial logistic regression would use the following input parameters: two-tailed, log-normal 
distribution, alpha level of .05, power level of .95, and odds ratio of 1.8. Following the 
recommended thresholds provided by Chen et al. (2010), an odds ratio of 1.8 was used to 
approximate the lower bounds of a medium effect. While finding a small effect may be desirable 
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in some contexts, small odds ratios may not reflect operationally-meaningful differences that 
were of interest in this study. The a priori power analysis using the noted input parameters and 
odds ratio of 1.8 indicated a sample size of 95 for the binomial logistic regression. 
ASRS incident reports. This study used aviation incident report data from the ASRS 
database and the following is an overview of the process used by ASRS for coding the data 
(Figure 1). ASRS receives, processes, and analyzes voluntarily submitted incident reports from 
pilots, air traffic controllers, and other individuals, which was entered and maintained in a 
growing database of aviation incident reports. The ASRS analyst team is comprised of highly 
trained pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics, and members of management teams with 
substantial aviation and human factors experience (ASRS, 2016). Given the focus of this study 
being flight crews, the remaining explanation of the data coding process will be specific to 
reports filed by the flight crew. ASRS receives reports filed by pilots which are screened by at 
least two analysts for initial categorization and early triage of processing (ASRS, 2016). During 
the early stages of screening the reports, ASRS analysts have access to information from other 
sources, such as the Aviation Safety Awareness Program and air carrier companies, that is 
relevant to the reported incident. All reports are subject to extensive analysis by ASRS staff, and 
any reports needing further analysis are identified. Any discrepancies in the individual screening 
by the analysts are subject to further iteration to ensure inter-coder reliability. Reports are 
subsequently de-identified and each report is subject to further analysis in a final check to assure 
coding accuracy. Throughout the coding process, quality assurance checks are performed to 
ensure coding quality and assuring confidentiality. The finalized coded reports are entered and 
archived into the publicly-available ASRS database.  
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Figure 1. Representation of the ASRS process for coding incident reports. Adapted from ASRS 
(2016). 
Each ASRS report stored in the database contains 63 fields for coded data, although not 
all fields will contain data depending on the report circumstances and event outcomes. The 
ASRS report data fields of interest for this study were: 
 ACN (accession number) 
 Aircraft 1 Aircraft operator 
 Aircraft 1 Operating under FAR part 
 Aircraft 1 Flight phase 
 Person 1 Reporter organization 
 Person 1 Function 
 Person 1 Human factors 
 Person 2 Reporter organization 
 Person 2 Function  
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 Person 2 Human factors 
 Events Anomaly 
 Events Result  
 Assessments Contributing factors/situations 
 Assessments Primary problems 
 Report 1 Narrative 
 Report 2 Narrative  
 Report 1 Synopsis  
All data necessary for this study could be found in these 17 data fields. The ACN field 
contains an assigned accession number for the ASRS database coding. Aircraft 1 fields contain 
data relevant to the commercial aircraft in which the event occurred. Person 1 and Person 2 fields 
contain data specific to the respective flight crew members. Events fields contain data identifying 
the incident and outcome. Assessments fields include categories of factors and situations that 
either contributed to the event or were considered the primary problem. Report 1 and Report 2 
fields contain narrative reporting data from Person 1 and Person 2, with exception of the Report 
1 Synopsis field which is an overall synopsis provided by the ASRS analyst of the incident. 
 Sample pool selection. The reports of interest in this study were from commercial 
passenger air carriers operating under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121. A study sample 
pool of incident reports was gathered from the ASRS online reporting system database at 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html using the following criteria: 
 Date of incident: 01 January 2012 to 31 December 2016 
 Federal aviation regulations: Part 121 
 Reporting organization: air carrier 
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 Reporter function: captain, first officer, pilot flying, pilot not flying 
 Phase of flight: initial approach, final approach, landing 
 Event type: unstabilized approach 
 Contributing factors: human factors 
The database query output resulted in a return of 444 reports meeting this initial study sample 
criteria (Appendix A), and the reports were downloaded in Excel format (Appendix B). 
Dual-reporter incidents. Each incident report recorded in the ASRS database may have 
either one or two reporters. In the case of incidents with only one reporter, there is the potential 
for each human factor to be coded once for that single reporter. However, incidents with two 
reporters (i.e., dual-reporter incidents) have the potential of each human factor being coded 
twice, once for each reporter. There were two approaches that could be taken when determining 
how to treat dual-reporter incidents. One approach was to analyze the report twice, once for each 
reporter. However, this approach would create an unnecessary confound of increasing the 
frequency of incidents, since the single incident would be coded twice in the research study. The 
alternative approach was to collapse the human factors in dual-reporter reports, such that double 
indicated human factors (i.e., when the same human factors is attributed to both reporters) would 
still be coded only once for the specific incident. This study used the second approach of 
collapsing the data of any dual-reporter incidents, since the investigation was primarily interested 
in the human factors associated with the incident and not specific to the reporter. The collapsing 
of the data occurred during the screening for exclusions. 
 Screening for exclusions. With the initial sample pool of 444 reports downloaded to 
Excel, reports were screened for exclusions. Exclusions were based on the following criteria: (a) 
any target field (i.e., cell) of interest was empty (i.e., contained no data); or, (b) the sole human 
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factor coded as contributing to the event was “other/unknown.”  Reports with missing data in 
cells of interest were excluded in order to provide for comparisons of all independent variables, 
assuming an adequate sample size could be maintained. Reports with ‘unknown’ human factors 
were not able to be meaningfully analyzed in the context of this study. 
Reviewing for exclusions was a multi-phase process, and excluded report ACNs are 
provided in Appendix C. The first review for exclusions was for all reports that did not have an 
explicitly coded human factor. When relevant to the incident, an ASRS report will have the 
human factor(s) coded in the fields titled “Person 1 Human Factors” and/or “Person 2 Human 
Factors.” These fields correspond respectively to columns BS and CC in the Excel data from 
ASRS database. This resulted in an exclusion of 46 reports. The second review for exclusions 
was for all reports that had only “Other / Unknown” coded in the “human factors” fields. Reports 
with ‘unknown’ human factors are not able to be meaningfully analyzed in the context of this 
study. This resulted in another three reports being excluded. The third review for exclusions was 
for any reports that had missing fields of interest, and there were no reports excluded based on 
this criterion. As part of the process of exclusions, the data of the dual-reporter incidents were 
collapsed, since this investigation was primarily interested in the human factors associated with 
the incident and not specific to the reporter. The “Event Anomaly” field of all remaining 395 
reports were reviewed and verified as including “Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized 
Approach.” All reports included this ‘event anomaly,’ and there were no additional exclusions. 
The “Events Result” field was reviewed and two reports were identified with no data in the field, 
which resulted in the two reports being excluded. A final review for exclusions was for any 
reports that did not explicitly code “Human Factors” as a “Contributing Factors / Situations” in 
the incident. This resulted in another 63 reports being excluded. This process of screening for 
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exclusions resulted in a reduced initial sample of 330 ASRS reports, which were subsequently 
reviewed a second time using the aforementioned process of eliminations to ensure there were no 
oversights. No additional exclusions were noted, and this became the pool of reports from which 
the sample set of 95 reports would be randomly selected for this study. 
Randomized sample selection. The study sample of 95 reports were randomly selected 
using a table of random numbers (RAND, 2001) and the following procedural steps: 
1. All 330 ASRS report numbers (ACNs) were entered into a single column in Excel, in 
ascending numerical order, and each report was randomly assigned an independently 
generated and unique integer from 1 to 330, inclusive.  
2. Using a separate sheet in Excel and independent of the ACNs, a starting point on the 
table of random numbers was determined using the =RANDBETWEEN() function. 
The starting row was determined using =RANDBETWEEN(0,19999) and the starting 
column was determined using =RANDBETWEEN(1,10). The randomly generated 
numbers identified the starting point as Row 8716, Column 8 in the table of random 
numbers (RAND, 2001), which was the number 94922.  
3. The final three digits of the number on the table were used to identify a report for the 
study sample. If the final three digits were between 001 and 330, inclusive, then the 
associated ACN listed in Excel as part of step 1 was identified as a member of the 
study sample. If the final three digits were not between 001 and 330, inclusive, then a 
different number from the table was identified using the approach in step 4. For 
example, using the starting number of 94922, this number did not result in an 
identified report for the study sample because the final three digits were 922. ACNs 
were assigned unique identifiers of 1 through 330, inclusive. 
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4. The final digit of the number on the table of random numbers determined the number 
of rows to advance numerically and the column for the next number. For example, the 
final digit in the number 94922 is 2. This indicated advancing 2 rows numerically and 
using the number in column 2 of the table to identify the next potential report for the 
study sample. If the final digit was a 0, then it represented 10 for advancing to the 
next number on the table (i.e., advancing 10 rows and to column 10). If a number 
resulted in a repeated report number, such as 24308 and then 17308 (i.e., both with 
the final three digits of 308), then the previous digit used for advancing was repeated. 
If the final row and column of the table of random numbers was reached before the 95 
reports for the study sample were identified, then the procedure was to continue at the 
beginning of the table (i.e., Row 0, Column 1). 
5. Following the procedural steps 1 through 4, all 95 reports for the study sample were 
randomly selected. The ending point on the table of random numbers was Row 
10415, Column 10, which was number 7325. 
This approach provided for an unbiased random selection of 95 reports from the pool of 
330 reports that met the initial selection criteria and subsequently were not eliminated based on 
the exclusion criteria (Appendix D). 
Final review of study sample. The 95 reports identified as the study sample were 
reviewed for any further exclusions using the Word format of the reports (Appendix E). No 
additional exclusions were identified. The report narrative(s) and synopsis were reviewed and 
compared to the coded data. Although no inference was to be made regarding the agreement 
between narrative data and coded data, this step was intended to check for any possible errors 
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that may have warranted consultation with ASRS analysts. No concerns or errors were noted. All 
reports were verified as meeting the criteria for inclusion in the study. 
Converting text to binary fields. The ASRS database uses text fields for the human 
factors and event types, which are not appropriately formatted for a binomial logistic regression 
analysis. Using the Excel format of the 95 report study sample, both the human factors and event 
type text fields from ASRS were converted to binary fields for the subsequent binomial logistic 
regression analysis (Appendix F). This process uses a simple ‘If-Then’ algorithm to locate the 
target term in the text field (e.g., “confusion”) and output a binary value in the newly created 
numeric field (e.g., “1” if “confusion” was coded in text or “0” if not). A similar process was 
applied to all text fields of interest. 
Independent variables. With a sample size of 95 cases, all 12 ASRS-coded human 
factors – communication breakdown, confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, 
physiological, situational awareness, time pressure, training/qualifications, troubleshooting, 
workload, and other/unknown – posed to be too many IVs for a meaningful analysis. Agresti 
(2013) cites work by Peduzzi et al. (1996) as being a general standard for the number of 
predictors for which effects can be estimated, which was a 1:10 ratio of IVs to outcomes (i.e., 
cases). With 95 cases, using all 12 human factors for the binomial logistic regressions would 
have violated this standard. Therefore, the number of IVs needed to be reduced. A common 
approach to reducing the number of IVs for binomial logistic regression is post hoc p value 
assessment. However, this common approach is unnecessarily vulnerable to bias and more prone 
to sampling error (Agresti, 2013). 
An alternative approach was taken for this study. The ALAR Task Force report was 
consulted for the “situational awareness constructs” and “key psychosocial factors” that were 
  
45 
assessed as part of the prior FSF 2017 study, since the ALAR Task Force report was informing 
this current study. The ALAR Task Force situational awareness constructs and key psychosocial 
factors were carefully mapped to the ASRS-coded human factors (Appendix G). Taking this 
informed approach, eight ASRS human factors were identified for the current study: 
communication breakdown, confusion, fatigue, human-machine interface, situational awareness, 
time pressure, training/qualifications, and workload. Since these ASRS-coded human factors 
map to the constructs and factors identified by the ALAR Task Force, these eight human factors 
were identified as IVs for this current study.  
Given that the overall goal of this study was to inform aviation training designs, the 
remaining four human factors were reviewed for reconsideration as an IV in the current study. Of 
those remaining human factors, distraction was identified for inclusion. It was assumed that 
training designs can impose distractions, and distractions have been found to influence overall 
flight crew performance (Barnes & Monan, 1990; Foyle et al., 2005; Stayer & Cooper, 2015). 
This resulted in a total of nine human factors used for this current study: communication 
breakdown, confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, situational awareness, time 
pressure, training/qualifications, and workload. 
 Statistical procedures. Data was exported from Excel and imported into IBM SPSS 
Statistics 24 for generating descriptive statistics, chi-square tests, and binomial logistic 
regressions. Effect size for chi-square goodness-of-fits tests used the statistic w, which is 
interpreted using the same scale as phi. From the binomial logistic regressions, odds ratios were 
evaluated, and confidence intervals and significance levels also evaluated using maximum 
likelihood estimations. The quality of the model was evaluated using a Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test, which identifies how poorly a model predicts categorical outcomes. A 
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significant Hosmer and Lemeshow test would indicate a poorly fitted model. Evaluating the 
variance in the dependent variable that can be accounted for by the model was accomplished 
using the Nagelkerke R2 value. Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative 
predictive value were also be evaluated. An alpha level of .05 was used as the cutoff for 
statistical significance. 
Reliability and Validity 
 It was a fundamental assumption of this study that ASRS coding procedures and 
standards provide for adequate assurance of reliability and validity. As previously noted, each 
ASRS incident report is independently reviewed, analyzed, and coded by at least two highly 
trained analysts. Reports are cross-checked and discrepancies are subject to further iteration to 
ensure inter-coder reliability. Although there are no published reports including data on ASRS 
analyst inter-coder reliability (Beaubien & Baker, 2002), numerous investigations and studies of 
aviation safety have utilized the ASRS data.  
The potential concerns of validity in this study were specific to the ASRS classification 
and coding system. Beaubien and Baker (2002) summarize several considerations regarding the 
internal validity of taxonomies and reporting systems, following the work of Fleishman and 
Quaintance (1984). According to Beaubien and Baker (2002), internally valid taxonomies 
“reliably categorize events despite random fluctuations in the wording of the narrative text,…use 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive descriptors, and…reveal meaningful patterns” (p. 5). In terms 
of external validity, Beaubien and Baker (2002) summarize Fleishman and Quaintance’s (1984) 
suggestions that externally valid taxonomies “cross-validate with new data sets,…identify gaps 
in the available research,…that predict meaningful outcomes” (p. 6). ASRS takes specific 
measures to mitigate the risks to validity. All ASRS reports are independently analyzed and 
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coded by at least two highly trained analysts. Given the voluntary self-reporting by the flight 
crew, ASRS analysts use additional information from other sources and aviation experience 
when coding reports.  It was assumed that risks to internal and external validity were mitigated 
by the aforementioned measures taken by ASRS.  
As for other potential issues of reliability and validity specific to this current study, the 
researcher did not make additional inferences from the coded or narrative text data in the ASRS 
incident reports. Nor did the researcher make further interpretation of narrative text provided by 
flight crew or analyst synopses. Rather, the researcher used the ASRS coding and data explicitly 
as it appears in the report outputs generated from the ASRS online database.  
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Chapter IV 
Findings and Results 
 The purpose of this quantitative ex post facto study was to critically examine and analyze 
ASRS incident report data to investigate the associations of coded flight crew human factors with 
reported incidents of unstabilized approaches and landings. The current study used binomial 
logistic regression to test associations and relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables in the study sample of ASRS reports. The independent variable in this study was the 
ASRS-coded human factors previously identified by ASRS analysts as contributing to the 
reported aviation event. The dependent variable in this study was the reported event outcome of 
the unstabilized approach, either continued to landing or go-around. Results of the binomial 
logistic regression were used to answer three research questions that guided the study. These 
questions were of the human factors contributing to unstabilized approaches, associations of the 
contributing human factors with unstabilized approaches, and relationships of the contributing 
human factors in the likelihood of the aviation event outcome.  
Outcomes of Unstabilized Approaches 
 Preliminary analysis of the study sample was conducted using a chi-square goodness-of-
fit test (Table 1). The assumptions of the chi-square test (Agresti, 2007; 2013) were satisfied. A 
single dichotomous variable was to be tested (reported unstabilized approach outcome), 
observations were independent (i.e., the outcome of one reported event was independent of all 
other reported events), and expected frequencies of each group of the tested variable was at least 
five. Results of the chi-square test revealed statistically significant differences in the outcome of 
the reported unstabilized approaches (χ2(1) = 6.579, p = .01, w = .26), with less than 37% of 
unstabilized approaches responded to with go-around compliance. These results suggest that the 
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differences in event outcomes during unstabilized approaches could not be attributed to chance, 
which supported the efforts of this study in understanding these differences. 
Table 1 
Chi-square Goodness-of-Fit Test of Unstabilized Approach Event Outcome 
Event outcome Observed Expected χ2 p 
Continued to landing 60 47.5 6.579 .01 
Go-around/missed approach 35 47.5   
Note. N = 95.  = .05. 
  
Human Factors Contributing to Unstabilized Approaches 
 During routine processing of ASRS incident reports, twelve human factors are assessed 
by ASRS analysts for their contribution as factors to the reported aviation incidents: 
communication breakdown, confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, 
physiological-other, situational awareness, time pressure, training/qualification, troubleshooting, 
workload, and other/unknown. Using the study sample, frequencies were calculated and 
crosstabs constructed to assess the extent to which the twelve human factors are identified by the 
ASRS analysts as contributing factors to aviation incidents of unstabilized approaches.  
Review of the report sample revealed that all twelve human factors were coded as contributing to 
reported unstabilized approaches. However, the proportion of reports in which each human factor 
contributed varied. A table illustrating the human factors and event outcome coded by ASRS 
report number is provided in Appendix H.  
The frequencies of human factors coded as contributing to unstabilized approaches are 
provided in Table 2. Given that a criteria of this study was that human factors were identified as 
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a contributing factor in the reported incident, each report contained at least one human factor 
coded as contributing. There were 21 reports (22.1%) that had 1 contributing human factor, 30 
reports (31.6%) with 2 contributing human factors, 17 reports (17.9%) with 3 contributing 
human factors, 10 reports (10.5%) with 4 contributing human factors, 9 reports (9.5%) with 5 
contributing factors, 7 reports (7.4%) with 6 contributing factors, and 1 report (1.1%) with 7 
contributing factors. 
Table 2 
Frequencies of Human Factors Contributing to Unstabilized Approaches 
ASRS-coded human factor 
Contributed to unstabilized approach 
% of reportsa # of reportsb 
Communication breakdown 31.6% 30 
Confusion 30.5% 29 
Distraction 31.6% 30 
Fatigue 12.6% 12 
Human-machine interface 25.3% 24 
Physiological-other† 1.1% 1 
Situational awareness 77.9% 74 
Time pressure 14.7% 14 
Training/qualifications 22.1% 21 
Troubleshooting† 1.1% 1 
Workload 27.4% 26 
Other/unknown† 4.2% 4 
Note. N = 95. aTotal percentage of reports will exceed 100% because each contributing may be coded in 
more than one report of the sample. bTotal number of reports will exceed 95 because each contributing 
may be coded in more than one report of the sample. †Excluded from subsequent analyses. 
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Cross-tabulations of the human factors with the outcome of unstabilized approaches were 
constructed. Each human factor is noted as either being coded (“Yes”) or not coded (“No”) by 
ASRS analysts in reports of unstabilized approaches that had an outcome of either continued to 
landing (“Non-compliance”) or go-around (“Compliance”). The cross-tabulation data provides a 
more detailed depiction of human factors contributing to the dichotomous outcome of reported 
unstabilized approaches. 
 Communication breakdown. Communication breakdown was coded as a contributing 
factor in 31.6% of the sample incident reports. Of those reports noting communication 
breakdown as a contributing factor, 63.3% of the reported incidents were unstabilized 
approaches continued to landing and 36.7% of the reports noted flight crews completing a go-
around (Table 3). When communication breakdown was not coded as a contributing factor, data 
indicated a near identical proportion, with 63.1% of reports noting flight crews continued an 
unstabilized approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (36.9%).  
Table 3 
Cross-tabulation of Communication Breakdown in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Communication breakdown Yes Count  19  (18.9) 11  (11.1) 
  % within factor 63.3% 36.7% 
 No Count 41  (41.1) 24  (23.9) 
  % within factor 63.1% 36.9% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
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 Confusion. Confusion was coded as a contributing factor in 30.5% of the sample incident 
reports. Of those reports noting confusion as a contributing factor, 72.4% of the reported 
incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 27.6% of the reports noted 
flight crews instead completing a go-around (Table 4). When confusion was not coded as a 
contributing factor, data reflected a similar trend but of a lesser magnitude: 59.1% of reports 
noting flight crews continued an unstabilized approach to landing rather than executing a go-
around (40.9%). 
Table 4 
Cross-tabulation of Confusion in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Confusion Yes Count 21  (18.3) 8  (10.7) 
  % within factor 72.4% 27.6% 
 No Count 39  (41.7) 27  (24.3) 
  % within factor 59.1% 40.9% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Distraction. Distraction was coded as a contributing factor in 31.6% of the sample 
incident reports. Of those reports noting distraction as a contributing factor, 60.0% of the 
reported incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 40.0% of the reports 
noted flight crews completing a go-around (Table 5). When distraction was not coded as a 
contributing factor, data revealed similar, with 64.6% of reports noting flight crews continued an 
unstabilized approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (35.4%). 
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Table 5 
Cross-tabulation of Distraction in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Distraction Yes Count 18  (18.9) 12  (11.1) 
  % within factor 60.0% 40.0% 
 No Count 42  (41.1) 23  (23.9) 
  % within factor 64.6% 35.4% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Fatigue. Fatigue was coded as a contributing factor in 12.6% of the sample incident 
reports. Of those reports noting fatigue as a contributing factor, 66.7% of the reported incidents 
were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 33.3% of the reports noted flight crews 
completing a go-around (Table 6). When fatigue was not coded as a contributing factor, 62.7% 
of the reports noted that flight crews continued an unstabilized approach to landing rather than 
executing a go-around (37.3%). 
Table 6 
Cross-tabulation of Fatigue in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Fatigue Yes Count 8  (7.6) 4  (4.4)† 
  % within factor 66.7% 33.3% 
 No Count 52  (52.4) 31  (30.6) 
  % within factor 62.7% 37.3% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
†Expected count less than 5. 
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Human-machine interface. Human-machine interface was coded as a contributing 
factor in 25.3% of the sample incident reports. Of those reports noting human-machine interface 
as a contributing factor, 58.3% of the reported incidents were unstabilized approaches continued 
to landing and 41.7% of the reports instead indicated that flight crews completed a go-around 
(Table 7). When human-machine interface was not coded as a contributing factor, report data 
revealed that 64.8% of flight crews continued an unstabilized approach to landing rather than 
executing a go-around (35.2%). 
Table 7 
Cross-tabulation of Human-Machine Interface in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Human-machine interface Yes Count 14  (15.2) 10  (8.8) 
  % within factor 58.3% 41.7% 
 No Count 46  (44.8) 25  (26.2) 
  % within factor 64.8% 35.2% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Physiological-other. Physiological-other was coded as a contributing factor in only 1 of 
the 95 sample incident reports (1.1%), and it was a report of an unstabilized approach continued 
to landing (Table 8). Of the remaining reports in which physiological-other was not coded as a 
contributing factor, 59.4% of the reports noted that flight crews continued an unstabilized 
approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (34.6%). Physiological-other was not 
included as an IV in the subsequent binomial logistic regressions. 
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Table 8 
Cross-tabulation of Physiological-Other in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Physiological-other Yes Count 1  (0.6)† 0  (0.4)† 
  % within factor 100.0% 0.0% 
 No Count 59  (59.4) 35  (34.6) 
  % within factor 62.8% 37.2% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts.  
†Expected count less than 5. 
 
Situational awareness. Situational awareness was coded as a contributing factor in 
77.9% of the incident reports. For reports noting situational awareness as a contributing factor, 
68.9% of the reported incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 31.1% of 
the reports noted flight crews instead completing a go-around (Table 9). When situational 
awareness was not coded as a contributing factor, data showed a different trend: fewer flight 
crews continued unstabilized approaches to landing (42.9%) than executed a go-around (57.1%).  
Table 9 
Cross-tabulation of Situational Awareness in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Situational awareness Yes Count 51  (46.7) 23  (27.3) 
  % within factor 68.9% 31.1% 
 No Count 9  (13.3) 12  (7.7) 
  % within factor 42.9% 57.1% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
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Time pressure. Time pressure was coded as a contributing factor in 14.7% of the sample 
incident reports. Of those reports noting time pressure as a contributing factor, 64.3% of the 
reported incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 35.7% of the reports 
noted flight crews had completed a go-around (Table 10). When time pressure was not coded as 
a contributing factor, 63.0% of the reports noted flight crews had continued an unstabilized 
approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (37.0%). 
Table 10 
Cross-tabulation of Time Pressure in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Time pressure Yes Count 9  (8.8) 5  (5.2) 
  % within factor 64.3% 35.7% 
 No Count 51  (51.2) 30  (29.8) 
  % within factor 63.0% 37.0% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Training/qualifications. Training/qualifications was coded as a contributing factor in 
22.1% of the sample incident reports. Of those reports noting training/qualifications as a 
contributing factor, 53.8% of the reported incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to 
landing and 46.2% of the reports instead indicated that flight crews completed a go-around 
(Table 11). When training/qualifications was not coded as a contributing factor, report data 
revealed that 66.7% of flight crews continued an unstabilized approach to landing rather than 
executing a go-around (33.3%). 
 
  
57 
Table 11 
Cross-tabulation of Training/Qualifications in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Training/qualifications Yes Count 13  (13.3) 8  (7.7) 
  % within factor 61.9% 38.1% 
 No Count 47  (46.7) 27  (27.3) 
  % within factor 63.5% 36.5% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Troubleshooting. Troubleshooting was coded as a contributing factor in only 1 of the 95 
sample incident reports (1.1%), and it was a report of an unstabilized approach continued to 
landing (Table 12). Of the remaining reports in which troubleshooting was not coded as a 
contributing factor, 62.8% of the reports noted that flight crews continued an unstabilized 
approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (37.2%). Troubleshooting was not 
included as an IV in the subsequent binomial logistic regressions. 
Table 12 
Cross-tabulation of Troubleshooting in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Troubleshooting Yes Count 1  (0.6)† 0  (0.4)† 
  % within factor 100.0% 0.0% 
 No Count 59  (59.4) 35  (34.6) 
  % within factor 62.8% 37.2% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
†Expected count less than 5. 
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Workload. Workload was coded as a contributing factor in 27.4% of the sample incident 
reports. Of those reports noting workload as a contributing factor, 53.8% of the reported 
incidents were unstabilized approaches continued to landing and 46.2% of the reports noted 
flight crews completing a go-around (Table 13). When workload was not coded as a contributing 
factor, data indicated that in 66.7% of reports flight crews continued an unstabilized approach to 
landing rather than executing a go-around (33.3%). 
Table 13 
Cross-tabulation of Workload in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Workload Yes Count 14  (16.4) 12  (9.6) 
  % within factor 53.8% 46.2% 
 No Count 46  (43.6) 23  (25.4) 
  % within factor 66.7% 33.3% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
 
Other/unknown. Other/unknown was coded as a contributing factor in 4 of the 95 
sample incident reports (4.2%), and 3 of those 4 reports were of an unstabilized approach 
continued to landing (Table 14). Of the remaining reports in which other/unknown was not 
coded as a contributing factor, 62.6% of the reports noted that flight crews continued an 
unstabilized approach to landing rather than executing a go-around (37.4%). Other/unknown was 
not included as an IV in subsequent binomial logistic regressions. 
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Table 14 
Cross-tabulation of Other/Unknown in Relation to Unstabilized Approach Outcomes 
 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Other/unknown Yes Count 3  (2.5)† 1  (1.5)† 
  % within factor 75.0% 25.0% 
 No Count 57  (57.5) 34  (33.5) 
  % within factor 62.6% 37.4% 
Note. N = 95. Non-italicized counts are observed counts and italicized counts are expected counts. 
†Expected count less than 5. 
 
 The remaining analyses were conducted using the nine human factors identified for the 
binomial logistic regression: communication breakdown, confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-
machine interface, situational awareness, time pressure, training/qualifications, and workload. 
The goals of the analyses were to test for associations and relationships of the human factors 
with reported unstabilized approach outcomes. 
Associations and Relationships of Human Factors and Unstabilized Approaches 
 A binomial logistic regression was used in testing associations of human factors with 
unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database. The assumptions and requirements for 
binomial logistic regression (Agresti, 2007; 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) were examined 
and all were satisfied. The dependent variable –reported unstabilized approach event outcome – 
was dichotomous: continued to landing or go-around. The independent variables – nine human 
factors – were nominal: coded as either contributing or not contributing to the reported 
unstabilized approach. The observations were independent, such that a human factor was coded 
by an ASRS analyst as either contributing or not contributing and an observation could not 
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belong to both categories of event outcome (i.e., not both continued to landing and go-around). 
Finally, there were at least 10 cases per independent variable, no indication of multicollinearity 
(Appendix I), and no significant outliers. 
 Initial review of the unweighted case processing indicated that the analysis was 
constructed properly, as the total number of cases processed was the expected sample of 95 
reports. There were no missing cases and no cases were unselected (Table 15). 
Table 15 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted cases  N Percent 
Selected cases Included in analysis 95 100.0 
 Missing cases   0     0.0 
 Total 95 100.0 
Unselected cases    0     0.0 
Total  95 100.0 
 
Review of the categorical variable coding revealed no low frequency counts (Table 16). 
Frequencies of human factors being coded as contributing factor (“Yes”) in the reported 
unstabilized approach ranged from being coded in 12 to 74 reports, with a median of 26 and 
mode of 30 reports. Frequencies of human factors being coded as not contributing (“No”) in the 
reported unstabilized approach ranged from being not coded in 21 to 83 reports, with a median of 
69 and mode of 65 reports.  
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Table 16 
Frequency of Categorical Variables Codings 
Categorical variable 
Frequency 
Yes No 
Communication breakdown 30 65 
Confusion 29 66 
Distraction 30 65 
Fatigue 12 83 
Human-machine interface 24 71 
Situational awareness 74 21 
Time Pressure 14 81 
Training/qualifications 21 74 
Workload 26 69 
 
 Baseline analysis. As a baseline analysis at Step 0, no independent variables were added 
to the model, which left only the constant. Without any independent variables added and using a 
cutoff value of .500, the model correctly predicted that a report would be one of an unstabilized 
approach continued to landing 63.2% of the time (Table 17).  
Table 17 
Classification Table with Constant Only at Step 0 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Percent 
correct 
Step 0 Unstabilized 
approach outcome 
Non-compliance  60 0 100.0 
 Compliance 35 0     0.0 
 Overall percentage     63.2 
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 Table 18 displays the iteration history when only the constant is included in the model, 
with the iteration terminated when the parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001. The 
variable included in the equation of the baseline analysis is the dependent variable of the 
reported unstabilized approach outcome (Table 19). The results at Step 0 indicated that for every 
one unit increase in the dependent variable there was a 1.714 increase in the likelihood of a 
report being one in which the unstabilized approach was continued to landing versus go-around. 
Table 18 
Iteration History with Constant Only at Step 0 
Iteration  -2 Log likelihood Coefficients constant 
Step 0 1 125.044 .526 
 2 125.041 .539 
 3 125.041 .539 
 
Table 19 
Variables in the Equation at Step 0 
  B SE Wald χ2 df p 
Odds 
Ratio 
Step 0 Constant .539 .213 6.422 1 .011 1.714 
Note.  = .05. 
 The independent variables not included in the model at Step 0 are provided in Table 20. 
Based on the results at Step 0, only one human factor was expected to improve the fit of the 
model. Situational awareness had a Lagrange multiplier test score of 4.775 (p = .029). All other 
human factors had p-values greater than .215, indicating that the fit of the model was not 
expected to improve when the other human factors were entered. 
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Table 20 
Variables not in the Equation at Step 0 
   Score df p 
Step 0 Variables Communication breakdown .001 1 .981 
  Confusion 1.537 1 .215 
  Distraction .188 1 .665 
  Fatigue .073 1 .787 
  Human-machine interface .321 1 .571 
  Situational awareness 4.775 1 .029 
  Time pressure .009 1 .925 
  Training/qualifications .018 1 .893 
  Workload 1.334 1 .248 
 Overall Statistics 7.680 9 .567 
Note.  = .05. 
Binomial logistic regression results. At Step 1, binomial logistic regression tested the 
overall statistical significance if the independent variables – i.e., human factors – were added to 
the model. The overall statistical significance of the model is an indication of how well the 
model that includes the independent variables can predict the dependent variable compared to 
when no independent variables are added to the model. For the purposes of this study, the 
dependent (outcome) variable is whether or not the report to which the coded human factors are 
attributed is either an unstabilized approach that continued to landing versus go-around. Table 21 
displays the iteration history when the independent variables were included with the constant in 
the model, with the iteration terminated when the parameter estimates changed by less than 
0.001. The initial -2 Log Likelihood was 125.041 and the estimation was terminated after four 
iterations as an ending -2 Log Likelihood value of 117.265.  
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Table 21 
Iteration History with Variables Added at Step 1 
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Step 
1 
1 117.400 -.262 -.180 -.531 .082 .042 .170 .992 -.240 .195 .470 
2 117.265 -.264 -.209 -.645 .091 .074 .190 1.065 -.274 .226 .539 
 3 117.265 -.264 -.210 -.650 .092 .076 .191 1.067 -.275 .227 .542 
 4 117.265 -.264 -.210 -.650 .092 .076 .191 1.067 -.275 .227 .542 
 
The significance of the contribution of human factors to the model is reported in Table 
22. The omnibus test revealed that adding the independent variables of the human factors to the 
model did not provide a significant contribution (χ2(9) = 7.776, p = .557). Although the human 
factors did not significantly contribute to the model, the results of the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Test (Table 23) indicate that the model is not a poor fit (χ2(8) = 6.882, p = .549).  
Table 22 
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients for Human Factors 
  χ2 df p 
Step 1 Step 7.776 9 .557 
 Block 7.776 9 .557 
 Model 7.776 9 .557 
Note.  = .05. 
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Table 23 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 χ2 df p 
Step 1 6.882 8 .549 
Note.  = .05. 
 The model summary provides an indication of the amount of variation in the dependent 
variable that can be explained by the model containing the independent variables. The Cox & 
Snell R2 and Naglekerke R2 values are equivalent to the R2 of multiple regression. The results of 
the logistic regression model summary indicate that the explained variation in the dependent 
variable – i.e., outcome of the reported unstabilized approach – based on the model including the 
human factors ranges from 7.9% to 10.7%, depending on the method used in calculating the 
explained variance (Table 24). 
Table 24 
Model Summary 
 -2 Log Likelihood The Cox & Snell R2 Naglekerke R2 
Step 1 117.265 .079 .107 
 
Adding the independent variables and using a cutoff value of .500, the model at Step 1 
correctly predicted that a report would be one of an unstabilized approach continued to landing 
67.4% of the time (Table 25). This represents a 4.6% increase in classification accuracy. The 
model sensitivity was 88.3%, indicating the correct prediction of a report being one of an 
unstabilized approach continued to landing. Model specificity indicated that 31.4% of the reports 
of an unstabilized approach resulting in a go-around were correctly predicted by the model. 
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Positive predictive value of the model was 68.8%, which is calculated as the ratio of correctly 
predicted reports of unstabilized approach continued to landing (n = 53) to the total of number of 
reports predicted with the outcome (n = 77). Negative predictive value of the model was 61.1%, 
which is calculated as the ratio of correctly predicted reports of unstabilized approach met by go-
around (n = 11) to the total of number of reports predicted with the outcome (n = 18).  
Table 25 
Step 1 Classification Table with Human Factors Added 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
Unstabilized approach outcome 
Non-
compliance 
Compliance 
Percent 
correct 
Step 1 Unstabilized 
approach outcome 
Non-compliance  53 7 88.3 
 Compliance 24 11 31.4 
 Overall percentage   67.4 
 
The results of the logistic regression with the human factors entered into the model with 
the constant are reported in Table 26. Three human factors – communication breakdown, 
confusion, and time pressure – were associated with decreased odds of the report being one of an 
unstabilized approach continued to landing when the human factor was coded as contributing to 
the event outcome. The remaining six human factors – distraction, fatigue, human-machine 
interface, situational awareness, training/qualifications, and workload – were associated with 
increased odds of the report being one of an unstabilized approach continued to landing when the 
human factor was coded as contributing to the event outcome.  
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Table 26 
Variables in the Equation at Step 1 
   
Wald 
χ2 
   95% CI for OR 
Variable entered at Step 1 B SE df p 
Odds 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Communication breakdown -.210 .561 .140 1 .709 .811 .270 2.435 
Confusion -.650 .562 1.337 1 .248 .522 .173 1.571 
Distraction .092 .520 .031 1 .860 1.096 .396 3.036 
Fatigue .076 .700 .012 1 .913 1.079 .274 4.257 
Human-machine interface .191 .573 .111 1 .739 1.210 .394 3.722 
Situational awareness 1.067 .571 3.487 1 .062 2.906 .949 8.906 
Time pressure -.275 .721 .145 1 .703 .760 .185 3.124 
Training/qualifications .227 .559 .165 1 .684 1.255 .420 3.754 
Workload .541 .520 1.084 1 .298 1.718 .620 4.757 
Constant -.264 1.033 .065 1 .798 .768   
Note.  = .05. 
Using the Wald χ2 test to determine the statistical significance of the contribution for each 
human factor to the model, the results indicate that none of the human factors added significantly 
to the model (all ps > .06). Although situational awareness was expected to improve the fit of the 
model as indicated during the baseline analysis, it did not result in a statistically significant 
contribution to the model when added (Wald χ2(1) = 3.487, p = .062, OR = 2.906, 95% CI [.949, 
8.906]). This result suggests that when situational awareness is coded as a contributing factor, 
the reported event is 2.91 times more likely to be an unstabilized approach continued to landing 
than when the factor is not coded as contributing. However, this contribution did not show an 
improvement above the null model when no independent variables were added. 
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Post Hoc Power Analysis 
 A post hoc power analysis was computed using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2009). The 
following same input parameters from the a priori power analysis were used for post hoc power 
analysis input: two-tailed, log-normal distribution, alpha level of .05, and power level of .95. 
However, for the post hoc power analysis, odds ratio of 1.7 and Naglekerke R2 value of .107 
were used based on the results from the study. The power analysis output indicated that the study 
had an actual power of .88 with the given post hoc input parameters. 
Summary 
 A binomial logistic regression was used to test the associations and relationships of 
ASRS-coded human factors on the likelihood that the reported event was an unstabilized 
approach continued to landing versus go-around. Preliminary chi-square test analysis of the 
study sample revealed statistically significant differences in the outcome of reported unstabilized 
approaches (χ2(1) = 6.579, p = .01), with more than 63% of the reported unstabilized approaches 
continued to landing and less than 37% responded to with go-around compliance. Nine of the 
twelve ASRS-coded human factors were used as the independent variables in the logistic 
regression: communication breakdown, confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, 
situational awareness, time pressure, training/qualifications, and workload. The dependent 
variable was the reported unstabilized approach event outcome, either continued to landing or 
go-around. The model explained between 7.9% and 10.7% of the variance in event outcome, 
depending on the method used in calculating the explained variance (Cox & Snell R2 or 
Naglekerke R2, respectively). The model sensitivity was 88.3%, specificity was 31.4%, positive 
predictive value was 68.8%, and negative predictive value was 61.1%. However, the logistic 
regression model was not statistically significant (χ2(9) = 7.776, p = .557). Although there were 
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associations of the ASRS-coded human factors with reported unstabilized approaches, the 
relationships of these associations were not statistically significant. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Informed by the findings and recommendations of the Flight Safety Foundation’s 
Approach and Landing Accident Reduction Task Force, this study critically examined and 
analyzed commercial aviation incident report data from unstabilized approach and landing 
events. Toward this end, this study used ASRS incident report data to investigate the associations 
of analyst-coded flight crew human factors with reported incidents of unstabilized approaches 
and landings. The independent variables in this study were the ASRS-coded human factors 
previously identified by ASRS analysts as contributing to the reported aviation event. The 
dependent variable in this study was the reported event outcome of the unstabilized approach, 
either continued to landing or go-around. Results of the binomial logistic regression were used 
to answer three research questions that guided the study. These questions were of the human 
factors contributing to unstabilized approaches, associations of the contributing human factors 
with unstabilized approaches, and relationships of the contributing human factors in the 
likelihood of the adverse aviation event outcomes. 
Discussion of Results 
 The results of the preliminary chi-square goodness of fit test revealed that there were 
statistically significant differences in the outcome of reported unstabilized approaches (χ2(1) = 
6.579, p = .01, w = .26), with less than 37% of the reported unstabilized approaches being 
responded to with go-around compliance. Given this low-medium effect size, the significant 
differences in event outcomes – unstabilized approaches continued to landing versus an executed go-
around – were meaningful and could not be attributed to chance. These findings provided support for 
subsequent analyses of the human factors and their associations to the event outcomes, and 
investigating answers to the research questions of this study. 
  
71 
Contributing human factors. The study results provided answers to all three research 
questions. The first question of this study was not used for hypothesis testing, but rather for 
descriptive understanding of the human factors coded during events of unstabilized approaches. 
RQ1. What human factors are identified in the ASRS reports as contributing factors to 
aviation incidents of unstabilized approaches? 
 Using descriptive statistics, it was found that all 12 human factors were represented in 
the contributing factors of the study sample. Situational awareness was the most often coded 
human factor, indicated as contributing to 77.9% of the reported unstabilized approaches. No 
other human factor was nearly as frequently coded. Five human factors were coded as 
contributing factors in 25.3% to 31.6% of the reports: communication breakdown, distraction, 
confusion, human-machine interface, and workload. The remaining human factors were coded in 
less than 23% of the reports. These results suggest that the reported events of unstabilized 
approaches are most frequently accompanied by the flight crew’s loss of situational awareness. 
This is a finding consistent with the results reported by the ALAR Task Force (2017).  
A particular pattern was revealed for all human factors other than situational awareness. 
Each human factor (excluding situational awareness) was coded as a contributing factor in fewer 
reports than coded as not contributing to the reported unstabilized approach. When the human 
factor was coded as contributing, the outcome of the reported unstabilized approach was that the 
flight crew continued to landing rather than executed a go-around. However, when the human 
factor was coded as not contributing to the reported unstabilized approach, it was still more 
likely that the report was of an unstabilized approach continued to landing. This was not true of 
the reports in which situational awareness was coded as a contributing factor. When coded as a 
contributing factor, the reports showed a pattern similar to all other human factors in that the 
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outcome was an unstabilized approach continued to landing. However, when situational 
awareness was not coded as contributing to the event, the reports were more likely to be of an 
unstabilized approach met with go-around compliance. 
It was also revealed during the review of the descriptive statistics that the majority of 
reports (53.7%) had only one or two human factors coded as contributing to the reported 
unstabilized approach. There were decreasing number of reports as the human factors coded as 
contributing to the event increased. These findings taken together suggest that the likelihood of 
an unstabilized approach may not be influenced by the number of contributing human factors, 
but rather the degree to which any human factor present in the event perturbed flight crew 
performance. Another potential explanation is that any human factor present during the adverse 
event interacted with other factors that were not part of this study, such as contributing factors of 
airspace structure or weather conditions.  
Associations of human factors with unstabilized approaches. The remaining two 
research questions are accompanied here with the associated null and alternate hypotheses for 
discussion. Since the two research questions are related, discussion of results relevant to the final 
two research questions will be presented together. 
RQ2. To what extent, if any, are the ASRS-coded human factors associated with unstabilized 
approaches reported in the ASRS database? 
H0. There are no statistically significant associations of ASRS-coded human factors with 
unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database. 
H1. There are statistically significant associations of ASRS-coded human factors with 
unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database. 
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Based on the binomial logistic regression analysis (χ2(9) = 7.776, p = .557), the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. There were no statistically significant associations revealed of 
ASRS-coded human factors with unstabilized approaches reported in the ASRS database. The 
only human factor that approached a significant association with reports of unstabilized 
approaches was situational awareness (Wald χ2(1) = 3.487, p = .062, OR = 2.906, 95% CI [.949, 
8.906]). These findings suggest that reports of unstabilized approaches continued to landing 
rather than met with go-around compliance cannot be solely attributed to the influence of the 
human factors assessed by ASRS analysts as contributing to the event.  
RQ3. If associations between the ASRS-coded human factors and unstabilized approaches 
exist, what is the relationship of the human factors in the likelihood that the reported event was an 
unstabilized approach continued to landing versus go-around? 
H0. There are no statistically significant relationships of human factors in the likelihood 
that the reported event was an unstabilized approach continued to landing versus go-around. 
H1. There are statistically significant relationships of human factors in the likelihood that 
the reported event was an unstabilized approach continued to landing versus go-around. 
Based on the binomial logistic regression analysis (χ2(9) = 7.776, p = .557), the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. There are no statistically significant relationships of ASRS-coded 
human factors in the likelihood that the reported event was an unstabilized approach continued to 
landing versus go-around. Although when situational awareness is coded as a contributing factor 
the reported event is 2.91 times more likely to be an unstabilized approach continued to landing, 
this relationship was not significant (Wald χ2(1) = 3.487, p = .062, OR = 2.906, 95% CI [.949, 
8.906]). As previously noted, this finding is consistent with the results reported by the ALAR 
Task Force (2017), which found that unstabilized approaches are most frequently accompanied 
by the flight crew’s loss of situational awareness. Elevated odds ratios were revealed in five 
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other human factors, although not found to be significant relationships with reported unstabilized 
approach outcomes: distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, training/qualifications, and 
workload. In sum, the likelihood that a reported unstabilized approach was continued to landing 
versus go-around compliance is not solely influenced by the human factors assessed by ASRS 
analysts as contributing to the event.  
Conclusions 
This study was an analysis of human factors identified as contributing factors in unsafe 
acts and attitudes, operational errors, and flight crew behaviors during unstabilized approaches in 
commercial aviation incidents reported to ASRS. The primary aim of the study was to assess if 
there was an association of the human factors with reported unstabilized approaches, such that 
the relationship of the human factors influenced the likelihood that the reported event was an 
unstabilized approach continued to landing versus go-around compliance. The results of this 
study revealed that there is a statistically significant difference in the outcome of reported 
unstabilized approaches, in which it is more likely the unstabilized approach will be continued to 
landing. The influence of decrements in flight crew situational awareness approached the 
threshold of being a significant contribution to the likelihood that the reported unstabilized 
approach was continued to landing. However, results from the binomial logistic regression of 
this study do not support a claim of the outcome likelihood being influenced by the contribution 
of any sole or combination of human factors. 
 Limitations. Limitations were identified at the onset of this study and these remain 
limitations. The inherent limitations associated with the ASRS database and self-report safety 
incident data could not be avoided. ASRS reporting is voluntary and relies on self-reporting, and 
therefore vulnerable to voluntary reporting bias. As previously noted, there is inherent risk of 
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hindsight bias and self-protective interpretation (Jentsch et al., 1999), and thus subject to 
reporting bias not only in what is reported but also what is not reported. Another limitation is that 
the narratives of the flight crew involved in the reported unstabilized approach may not include 
terms readily identified by ASRS analysts as matching the definitions and descriptions used for 
coding the human factors, and the narratives may not include adequate reporting for ASRS 
analysts to make more meaningful interpretations of the events. ASRS does not publish inter-
coder reliability data. Since ASRS reports are only those incidents that were reported, and not 
reflective of all such incidents and others that share similar operational characteristics, the 
analyses of this study are limited to a subpopulation of all commercial aircraft approaches.  
An additional limitation of this study that was not addressed at the onset is that it tested 
for odds ratios equivalent to a low-medium effect. It may be that the sample size of 95, although 
providing adequate power for detecting a low-medium effect if one existed, was not adequate for 
detecting odds ratios within the range of a small effect. When running an a priori power analysis 
using the parameters of this study with an adjusted odds ratio of 1.3 and R2 value of .107, the 
required sample size was determined to be 247 reports. When reducing the anticipated power 
from .95 to .80, and maintaining all other parameters, the required sample size was determined to 
be 148 reports. It may be that a low-medium effect does not exist. Further, detecting an existing 
small effect would require a larger sample than was obtained and used for this study. If binomial 
logistic regression models from the analyses are not significant, it may suggest that binomial 
logistic regression is not be the appropriate statistical test for the human factors data as it is 
currently coded in the ASRS database. Despite human factors being coded as contributing to 
adverse aviation events reported to ASRS, it remains possible that the ASRS database may not 
be the appropriate source for data investigating the psychology of go-around noncompliance. 
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Recommendations 
Although advances in the National Airspace System have resulted in increased 
commercial aviation system performance, these advances have created gaps in understanding 
flight crew performance, particularly in the context of operations during both typical and atypical 
conditions (Krois, Piccione, & McCloy, 2010). Changes in the flight deck that are part of 
evolving capabilities and technologies provide for new flight crew errors and a change in the 
nature of the errors (Krois et al., 2010). In addition, changes in flight crew member roles, 
responsibilities, and tasks necessitate flight crews needing to develop and maintain the 
appropriate knowledge and skills for safe operations (Krois et al., 2010).  Therefore, the 
effectiveness of established flight crew training techniques for mitigating errors and ensuring 
safe operations is increasingly important to NextGen commercial aviation safety.  
To this end, a recommendation is to use the results of the current study to inform 
investigation of smaller effects (i.e., smaller odds ratios) with the required larger sample size. 
There remains the potential of identifying patterns of human factors associated with and 
contributing to flight crew performance during reported incidents of unstabilized approaches and 
landings. In addition to using the ASRS-coded data, latent semantic analysis may provide 
additional guidance for interpreting the flight crew narratives of the events and using this data to 
cross-check the coding by ASRS analysts.  
Another recommendation is to analyze associations of the different combinations of 
human factors coded by ASRS as contributing to reported unstabilized approaches. It may be 
that certain combinations of human factors are associated with an increased likelihood in the 
outcome of unstabilized approaches. For example, while fatigue and workload alone are not 
significant contributors to the likelihood of unstabilized approaches continuing to landing, when 
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both are present during an unstabilized approach, there may be an increased influence due to the 
interaction of these two human factors. Additional investigation in this direction may be 
beneficial. 
Human factors may indeed have an influence on the likelihood of unstabilized 
approaches continued to landing rather than go-around compliance, and these human factors may 
be interacting with other non-human contributing factors. A more extensive analysis of ASRS 
data may provide additional lessons learned from reported unstabilized approaches and landings, 
and inform go-around training designs for improved flight crew compliance with go-around 
policies and procedures. Although the results of this current study did not reveal significant 
associations and relationships of human factors in the likelihood that the reported unstabilized 
approach was continued to landing versus go-around, the ASRS database includes other 
contributing factors and flight characteristics. Analyses of these other contributing factors, 
human factors, and other flight characteristics is warranted. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1 
 
Initial Reports Returned from ASRS Database Query 
 
1414688, 1414603, 1413626, 1413586, 1413132, 1412801, 1412795, 1412762, 1412760, 1412521, 1412007, 
1412005, 1412004, 1410473, 1409778, 1409426, 1409167, 1409093, 1408599, 1407790, 1407596, 1406972, 
1406675, 1406354, 1406311, 1405273, 1405100, 1404471, 1404053, 1403881, 1403827, 1403525, 1401551, 
1401405, 1399587, 1399074, 1397905, 1397395, 1397131, 1396613, 1394959, 1393492, 1392765, 1391653, 
1388636, 1387450, 1386643, 1385080, 1384058, 1383795, 1383653, 1383381, 1382407, 1380480, 1379894, 
1378648, 1377405, 1376157, 1375898, 1375004, 1374700, 1374634, 1374232, 1373143, 1373083, 1373082, 
1367469, 1366763, 1366660, 1366006, 1365666, 1365584, 1365490, 1364701, 1363844, 1362844, 1360886, 
1359059, 1356944, 1356752, 1354104, 1353015, 1351836, 1351148, 1350732, 1349591, 1349312, 1348328, 
1348273, 1348090, 1348079, 1347580, 1346137, 1345503, 1345428, 1345374, 1345218, 1345216, 1344743, 
1343684, 1343657, 1343435, 1342377, 1341860, 1341069, 1340892, 1340338, 1339182, 1338132, 1337976, 
1337968, 1337572, 1336808, 1336722, 1336150, 1335199, 1334891, 1334677, 1334273, 1333888, 1333863, 
1333577, 1333548, 1333430, 1332152, 1332051, 1332015, 1330266, 1329346, 1328189, 1327695, 1327519, 
1326553, 1326350, 1325447, 1325395, 1324915, 1324913, 1323301, 1323068, 1322997, 1322851, 1322849, 
1322540, 1321489, 1321321, 1320960, 1320754, 1320218, 1320030, 1319979, 1317459, 1317109, 1316669, 
1316634, 1316061, 1315557, 1314989, 1314699, 1314470, 1313626, 1313544, 1313483, 1313460, 1313228, 
1312881, 1311640, 1310569, 1310542, 1310136, 1309389, 1308918, 1307960, 1307521, 1306527, 1306375, 
1306371, 1306364, 1305966, 1305846, 1305208, 1303151, 1302997, 1302829, 1302589, 1301619, 1301258, 
1301224, 1300686, 1300263, 1299247, 1298831, 1297996, 1297464, 1296985, 1296951, 1296660, 1295731, 
1295428, 1295055, 1294869, 1294824, 1293789, 1292658, 1291948, 1291764, 1291760, 1291630, 1291417, 
1291333, 1291328, 1289944, 1288371, 1287500, 1287195, 1287126, 1287084, 1286770, 1285548, 1285378, 
1285256, 1284142, 1283708, 1283176, 1283142, 1282495, 1282125, 1281248, 1281122, 1279707, 1278675, 
1278561, 1277889, 1277566, 1275842, 1275759, 1275733, 1275613, 1275067, 1274993, 1274797, 1274670, 
1274453, 1274356, 1272592, 1272529, 1271960, 1270141, 1269994, 1269699, 1269280, 1268372, 1268324, 
1268264, 1268057, 1267226, 1265652, 1265502, 1265050, 1264315, 1263798, 1262825, 1259842, 1259778, 
1259369, 1256598, 1256422, 1256410, 1256160, 1255810, 1255795, 1255485, 1255136, 1254885, 1253009, 
1249901, 1249653, 1248662, 1248626, 1247208, 1246382, 1245601, 1244567, 1243430, 1241728, 1240824, 
1240423, 1239445, 1238861, 1238596, 1237849, 1237573, 1237272, 1236187, 1235287, 1235223, 1234287, 
1233088, 1233013, 1232882, 1230172, 1229487, 1225041, 1222952, 1221462, 1220314, 1219207, 1216835, 
1213939, 1212836, 1211144, 1207037, 1206147, 1204771, 1204276, 1202663, 1202512, 1201009, 1200969, 
1200906, 1200264, 1200017, 1199392, 1199034, 1197233, 1196972, 1196657, 1196189, 1196188, 1196012, 
1195963, 1193113, 1193080, 1192672, 1189311, 1189301, 1188272, 1188011, 1188009, 1187114, 1186810, 
1181206, 1180924, 1180426, 1180418, 1179168, 1176170, 1175877, 1174061, 1172797, 1171884, 1171791, 
1171169, 1166896, 1164988, 1164044, 1159773, 1156858, 1155343, 1153527, 1149809, 1147406, 1145608, 
1145555, 1145259, 1143311, 1143167, 1140139, 1138517, 1129035, 1125691, 1125286, 1124183, 1123288, 
1122904, 1122376, 1121745, 1121313, 1120843, 1120826, 1120607, 1120225, 1119793, 1118670, 1118442, 
1116949, 1116428, 1115098, 1111985, 1111797, 1099831, 1098189, 1093678, 1093059, 1092426, 1092101, 
1089901, 1086832, 1083103, 1082532, 1081126, 1079372, 1078505, 1077026, 1076937, 1073107, 1072832, 
1069544, 1067908, 1066801, 1065701, 1059618, 1056719, 1053350, 1050062, 1046405, 1044988, 1043438, 
1042497, 1035852, 1033302, 1033301, 1032599, 1031520, 1030437, 1030428, 1022898, 1013802, 1010803, 
1009258, 1007892, 1007386, 1005647, 1002221, 1001577, 995801, 995011, 994901, 993418, 993408, 990416, 
990391, 990077, 988672 
Note. ACNs listed in descending order. 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure A1. Representative ASRS database output in Excel format.  
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Appendix C 
 
Table A2 
 
Reports Excluded from the Initial Return from ASRS Database Query 
 
Excluded due to no “human factors” coded:  
 
1042497, 1043438, 1044988, 1065701, 1089901, 1175877, 1199034, 1211144, 1233013, 
1236187, 1241728, 1264315, 1267226, 1268372, 1274356, 1296985, 1297464, 1306364, 
1315557, 1317459, 1320960, 1322540, 1334891, 1336150, 1345374, 1345503, 1346137, 
1348273, 1349591, 1351148, 1356944, 1364701, 1373143, 1374232, 1374634, 1382407, 
1383381, 1383795, 1384058, 1396613, 1397131, 1409778, 1412005, 1412795, 1413586, 
1414603 
 
Excluded due to “Other / Unknown” being the only coded data of “human factors”: 
 
1115098, 1129035, 1332051 
 
Excluded due to “Human Factors” not being explicitly coded as a “Contributing Factors/ 
Situations” for the incident: 
 
988672, 994901, 1031520, 1033301, 1046405, 1066801, 1083103, 1093678, 1116428, 
1120607, 1125286, 1164988, 1166896, 1196657, 1199392, 1200906, 1229487, 1234287, 
1237573, 1239445, 1240423, 1243430, 1248662, 1255136, 1255795, 1256410, 1259369, 
1262825, 1265050, 1265502, 1275733, 1275759, 1285378, 1286770, 1287500, 1288371, 
1291333, 1291760, 1292658, 1294824, 1301224, 1301619, 1306375, 1313483, 1316634, 
1320218, 1332152, 1333430, 1337572, 1347580, 1348079, 1354104, 1365584, 1366660, 
1377405, 1387450, 1397905, 1399074, 1406972, 1407790, 1409167, 1412004, 1413626 
 
Excluded due to “Events Result” field being empty: 
 
1053350, 1072832 
 
Note. 114 total exclusions. 
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Appendix D 
Table A3 
 
ASRS Reports Included in the Study Sample 
 
 
993418, 995801, 1002221, 1007892, 1030428, 1035852, 1050062, 1067908, 1077026, 
1081126, 1092426, 1099831, 1111985, 1118442, 1118670, 1121313, 1124183, 1138517, 
1143167, 1143311, 1149809, 1155343, 1176170, 1181206, 1193113, 1200017, 1200264, 
1216835, 1220314, 1222952, 1225041, 1230172, 1233088, 1235223, 1237272, 1238861, 
1248626, 1253009, 1256422, 1263798, 1269699, 1270141, 1274993, 1277889, 1282495, 
1283142, 1283708, 1284142, 1287126, 1287195, 1289944, 1291417, 1295731, 1302589, 
1302829, 1305208, 1305846, 1310136, 1310542, 1311640, 1313460, 1314470, 1314699, 
1316669, 1326350, 1327695, 1328189, 1330266, 1333577, 1336722, 1337968, 1337976, 
1338132, 1339182, 1341860, 1343435, 1345216, 1348090, 1349312, 1353015, 1366763, 
1367469, 1373082, 1376157, 1385080, 1399587, 1401405, 1401551, 1406354, 1409093, 
1409426, 1410473, 1412521, 1412760, 1413132 
 
Note. N = 95. 
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Appendix E 
 
Figure A2. Representative ASRS report in Word format.  
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Appendix F 
 
 
Figure A3. Representative ASRS database output showing text field (upper panel) converted to 
binary fields (lower panel).  
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Appendix G 
 
 
Figure A4. Diagram mapping the ALAR Task Force “situational awareness constructs” and 
“psychosocial factors” to the ASRS-coded human factors. Each line indicates a mapping from 
the situational construct or psychosocial factor to the human factor. 
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Appendix H 
 
Table A4 
 
Human Factors and Event Outcome Coded by ASRS Report Number 
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993418              
995801              
1002221              
1007892              
1030428              
1035852              
1050062              
1067908              
1077026              
1081126              
1092426              
1099831              
1111985              
1118442              
1118670              
1121313              
1124183              
1138517              
1143167              
1143311              
1149809              
1155343              
1176170              
1181206              
1193113              
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1200017              
1200264              
1216835              
1220314              
1222952              
1225041              
1230172              
1233088              
1235223              
1237272              
1238861              
1248626              
1253009              
1256422              
1263798              
1269699              
1270141              
1274993              
1277889              
1282495              
1283142              
1283708              
1284142              
1287126              
1287195              
1289944              
1291417              
1295731              
1302589              
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1302829              
1305208              
1305846              
1310136              
1310542              
1311640              
1313460              
1314470              
1314699              
1316669              
1326350              
1327695              
1328189              
1330266              
1333577              
1336722              
1337968              
1337976              
1338132              
1339182              
1341860               
1343435              
1345216              
1348090              
1349312              
1353015              
1366763              
1367469              
1373082              
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1376157              
1385080              
1399587              
1401405              
1401551              
1406354              
1409093              
1409426              
1410473              
1412521              
1412760              
1413132              
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Appendix I 
Table A5 
Correlation Matrix 
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Step 
1 
Constant - .065 .009 -.102 -.582 -.304 -.185 -.309 -.347 -.191 
Communication 
breakdown 
.065 - -.096 -.210 -.180 -.332 -.181 -.003 -.117 .118 
 Confusion .009 -.096 - .028 -.177 -.065 .086 -.291 -.177 -.110 
 Distraction -.120 -.210 .028 - .029 .156 -.053 -.171 -.125 -.205 
 Fatigue -.582 -.180 -.177 .029 - .072 .075 .039 .110 -.038 
 
Human-machine 
interface 
-.304 -.332 -.065 .156 .072 - -.220 .020 .004 .069 
 
Situational 
awareness 
-.185 -.181 .086 -.053 .075 -.220 - -.210 .041 -.078 
 Time pressure -.309 -.003 -.291 -.171 .039 .020 -.210 - -.024 -.137 
 
Training/ 
qualifications 
-.347 -.117 -.177 -.125 .110 .004 .041 -.024 - .038 
 Workload -.191 .118 -.110 -.205 -.038 .069 -.078 -.137 .038 - 
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Appendix J 
Alignment with Program Core and Specialty Outcomes 
Core Outcome 1 
Students will be able to apply the fundamentals of air transportation as part of a global, 
multimodal transportation system, including the technological, social, environmental, and 
political aspects of the system to examine, compare, analyze and recommend conclusion.  
This study targeted safety concerns and issues of an ever-growing U.S. air transportation 
system. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2016), safety is top 
priority for the aviation industry and the primary goal of ‘continuous improvement’ efforts has 
been improving crew responses to undesired events. Among the concerning events are loss of 
control in-flight (LOC-I) events, which occur when flight crew are unable to maintain adequate 
and proper control of the aircraft and deviate from the intended flight parameters (IATA, 2015b). 
Analyses of LOC-I events indicate that multiple factors can influence the ability of flight crew to 
maintain controlled flight, and deteriorated conditions can result in airplane upset. Of additional 
concern are undesired aircraft states and unstabilized approaches, the latter of which is one of the 
most significant safety issues in commercial aviation (IATA, 2016). It is an IATA 
recommendation that commercial pilot training programs emphasize early recognition of flight 
parameter deviations threatening stable aircraft states in order to mitigate safety risks through 
appropriate corrections in flight operations (IATA, 2015a). By examining and analyzing ASRS 
data, the primary aim of this study was identifying incident-related influences and evaluating 
findings in support of recommendations informing effective interventions and aviation training 
for safer NextGen commercial operations. 
 
  
101 
Core Outcome 2 
The student will be able to identify and apply appropriate statistical analysis, to include 
techniques in data collection, review, critique, interpretation and inference in the aviation and 
aerospace industry.  
Given the categorical and nominal nature of the ASRS data, primarily nonparametric 
statistical methods were used. The appropriate statistical procedure for this study was binomial 
logistic regression. Binomial logistic regression allows for prediction of a discrete dependent 
outcome or criterion variable from a set of nominal independent or predictor variables 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Given the aim of this study was to identify the factors that can 
predict adverse aviation events, binomial logistic regression is more appropriate than chi-square 
contingency tables or log-linear analyses, which are used to test associations and relationships 
between variables (Agresti, 2013). An a priori power analysis was computed using G*Power 3 
(Faul et al., 2009) and the binomial logistic regressions were conducted using IBM SPSS 
Statistics 24. From the binomial logistic regressions, odds ratios were evaluated, and confidence 
intervals and significance levels were evaluated using maximum likelihood estimations. A post 
hoc power analysis was also computed using G*Power 3. 
Core Outcome 3 
The student will be able across all subjects to use the fundamentals of human factors in 
all aspects of the aviation and aerospace industry, including unsafe acts, attitudes, errors, 
human behavior, and human limitations as they relate to the aviators adaption to the aviation 
environment to reach conclusions. 
This study included explicit analysis of human factors identified as contributing factors in 
unsafe acts and attitudes, operational errors, and human behaviors and limitations during 
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commercial aviation incidents reported to ASRS. The ASRS database contains record of human 
factors contributing to the reported aviation events, including communication breakdown, 
confusion, distraction, fatigue, human-machine interface, physiological, situational awareness, 
time pressure, training/qualification, troubleshooting, and workload. These are the factors, 
among others identified by ASRS analysis as contributing to aviation incidents, and these factors 
were analyzed in this study for their associations to the likelihood of unstabilized approach 
incident outcomes. If the ASRS-coded contributing and human factors were associated to the 
likelihood that the reported event was an unstabilized approach continued to landing, then it was 
assumed that a model could be constructed and used to mine the ASRS database. Using 
algorithms based on identified factor relationships, common aviation events might be identified 
and gathered from the database, and the accompanying narratives used in designing training 
scenarios aimed at mitigating the human factor in aviation events. 
Core Outcome 4 
The student will be able to develop and/or apply current aviation and industry related 
research methods, including problem identification, hypothesis formulation, and interpretation 
of findings to present as solutions in the investigation of an aviation/aerospace related topic. 
The study was a continuation, and extension, of earlier analyses of ASRS data to answer 
questions and test hypotheses informed by previous studies (see Ross & Tomko, 2016, 2017) and 
relevant research literature investigating commercial aviation operations using incident report 
data. This study used a nonexperimental, single-group, quantitative ex post facto design. A 
nonexperimental approach was most appropriate since the independent variables were not 
manipulated during analysis of the ASRS incident reports. Further, non-randomized sample data 
were compiled into a single group for quantitative analyses. Since the analyses were of archived, 
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coded data from ASRS reports, an ex post facto approach was used. Methods similar to those of 
this study have previously been employed in researching contributing and predictive factors of 
aviation accidents (e.g., Baker, 2001; Shappell et al., 2007), aviation incidents (e.g., Barnes & 
Monan, 1990; Jentsch, Barnett, Bowers, & Salas, 1999; Walton & Politano, 2010), and joint 
analyses of accidents and incidents (e.g., Mosier et al., 2012), as well as evaluating safety 
taxonomies (e.g., Tiller & Bliss, 2017). 
Aviation Aerospace Education Technology Outcome 
The student will investigate, compare, contrast, analyze and form conclusions to current 
aviation, aerospace, and industry related topics in education technology, including computer 
based instruction, simulation systems, education foundations, curriculum development, 
continuing education, adult teaching and learning techniques, and memory and cognition.  
The fundamental aim of this study was to determine and assess the extent to which the 
identified contributing factors and narratives of ASRS incident reports might be exploited for 
scenario-based commercial aviation training designs. According to the FAA (2015), the aim of 
line operational simulation (LOS) is to provide flight crew opportunity for training line 
operations in realistic operational environments, including line operational flight training 
(LOFT) and special purpose operational training (SPOT).  Both LOFT and SPOT are intended to 
include realistic scenarios including “normal, non-normal, abnormal, or emergency procedures” 
(FAA, 2015), and the fidelity of the scenarios depends on explicit similarity to operational 
conditions. Where commercial aviation accidents may be few, the growing ASRS database 
contains detailed data and narratives of aviation incidents. It was an assumption of this study that 
these narratives might provide meaningful and realistic descriptions of normal, non-normal, 
abnormal, and emergency events. If the factors coded in the ASRS database are associated with 
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the likelihood of such aviation events as unstabilized approaches continued to landing, the next 
step would be to use the model to build the algorithms to mine the database for event-specific 
narratives, and use the reports to build training scenarios for safer commercial pilot operations in 
NextGen commercial aviation. 
 
